Structural Estimation of Search Intensity: Do Non-Imployed Workers Search Enough? by Wolthoff, R.P. et al.
TI 2007-071/3 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
 
Structural Estimation of Search 
Intensity:  
Do Non-Employed Workers search 
enough? 
 Pieter A. Gautier1,3 
José Luis Moraga-González2 
Ronald P. Wolthoff1 
 
1 Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, and Tinbergen Institute; 
2 University of Groningen; 
3 CEPR. 
 
  
Tinbergen Institute 
The Tinbergen Institute is the institute for 
economic research of the Erasmus Universiteit 
Rotterdam, Universiteit van Amsterdam, and Vrije 
Universiteit Amsterdam. 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Roetersstraat 31 
1018 WB Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 551 3500 
Fax: +31(0)20 551 3555 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
 
 
Most TI discussion papers can be downloaded at 
http://www.tinbergen.nl. 
 
Structural Estimation of Search Intensity:
Do Non-Employed Workers Search Enough?
Pieter A. Gautiery
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute, CEPR
José Luis Moraga-Gonzálezz
University of Groningen
Ronald P. Wolthoffx
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute
2 September 2007
Abstract
We present a structural framework for the evaluation of public policies intended to increase
job search intensity. Most of the literature denes search intensity as a scalar that inuences
the arrival rate of job o¤ers; here we treat it as the number of job applications that workers
send out. The wage distribution and job search intensities are simultaneously determined in
market equilibrium. We structurally estimate the search cost distribution, the implied matching
probabilities, the productivity of a match, and the ow value of non-labor market time; the
estimates are then used to derive the socially optimal distribution of job search intensities. From
a social point of view, too few workers participate in the labor market while some unemployed
search too much. The low participation rate reects a standard hold-up problem and the excess
number of applications result is due to rent seeking behavior. Sizable welfare gains (15% to
20%) can be realized by simultaneously opening more vacancies and increasing participation. A
modest binding minimum wage or conditioning UI benets on applying for at least one job per
period, increases welfare.
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1 Introduction
Many active labor market policies aim at increasing the search intensity of non-employed workers.
Examples include (i) unemployment sanctions, like cuts in the benets paid to the unemployed who
do not engage in active job search (see Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (2005)), (ii) counselling
and monitoring, like advising long term unemployed workers on how to draft application letters
(see Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw (2006)), (iii) nancial aids, like subsidizing child care in
order to increase the number of actively searching workers (see Heckman (1974) and Graham and
Beller (1989)), or (iv) re-employment bonus schemes (see Meyer (1996)). The evaluation of policy
programs of this kind is not easy because, on the one hand, it is di¢ cult to measure job search
intensity directly and, on the other hand, changes in search intensities a¤ect the wage distribution
and the matching rates for other workers. Hence, the general equilibrium e¤ects can be large. In
this paper we present a structural framework to estimate the primitive parameters of an equilibrium
search model with endogenous search intensity and free entry of vacancies. Those primitives are
the search cost distribution, the value of home production and the capital cost of vacancy creation.
The estimates can then be used to calculate the socially optimal labor market allocation, as well
as the desired search intensities and the desired level of labor market tightness.
We consider a discrete-time dynamic labor market with a continuum of identical, innitely-
lived workers and free entry of vacancies. At each point in time, workers are either employed at
one of the rms or non-employed. Employed workers stay in their job until their match with the
rm is destroyed by some exogenous shock and they become non-employed again. Non-employed
workers apply for jobs at the beginning of a period. Since search intensity is the policy parameter
of interest, we explicitly model it as the number of job applications workers send out per period.
For each application a worker incurs a search cost. This search cost di¤ers amongst workers and is
drawn from a common non-degenerate cumulative distribution function (cdf). As in Gautier and
Moraga-González (2004) (who consider a one period version of this model with identical workers),
wages and the number of applications are jointly determined in a simultaneous-moves game. Firms
enter the market and post wages to maximize prots. For the usual reasons, as explained in Burdett
and Judd (1983) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998), rms play mixed strategies and o¤er wages
from a continuous wage o¤er distribution.
Rather than assuming an exogenous specication for a matching function (see the summary of
empirical studies in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)), this is to our knowledge the rst paper that
estimates a labor search model where the matching process is not only endogenously determined as
a result of the rm and worker participation decisions, but also as a result of the search e¤orts of
heterogeneous workers. Therefore, in our model, the primitive parameters are not the elasticities
of an exogenously specied matching function but the quantiles of the search cost distribution.
As in Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2006), our aggregate matching function is based on micro
foundations and determined by the interplay between two coordination frictions: (i) workers do not
know where other workers send their job applications and (ii) rms do not know to which workers
other rms make employment o¤ers to. These two frictions operate in di¤erent ways for di¤erent
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distributions of worker search intensities and have implications on wage determination. Working
back from observed wages, we are able to estimate the quantiles of the search cost distribution and
the implied matching rates by maximum likelihood.1 To do this, we rst derive an equilibrium
relation between the accepted wage distribution and the wage o¤er distribution (which we do not
directly observe). Then, we use the wage o¤er distribution together with data on labor market
tightness and non-participation to estimate the distribution of search intensities and the matching
probabilities. Since every worker continues to send applications till the marginal benets of search
equal the search cost, we can use this optimality condition to retrieve the magnitude of search costs
for a given search intensity.
To illustrate the di¤erence with models where either the wage distribution or search intensity
is exogenous, consider the e¤ects of increasing the minimum wage. This policy makes search
more attractive on average. In our model, however, some workers may respond by increasing
the number of job applications they send out from zero to one, others will increase their optimal
number of job applications from one to two, and so on. Workers who already applied to many
jobs could also potentially react by applying to fewer jobs because the wage distribution becomes
more compressed. Each of these changes a¤ects the aggregate matching rate in its own right.
Consequently, the matching rate, the job o¤er arrival rate and the wage distribution are not policy
invariant. Moreover, the way these endogenous variables respond to policy changes depends on the
primitive search cost distribution.
We also derive the workers reservation wage in each segment, which depends on the ow
value of non-labor market time (i.e. home production and UI benets), search costs and the wage
distribution. Recently, Gautier and Teulings (2006) and Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2006)
argued that many search models cannot explain why reservation wages are substantially lower than
the average or maximum wage, while at the same time unemployment or unemployment duration
is low. In our model, unemployed workers who have a low search cost today realize that they can
have a high search cost tomorrow. Therefore, they are willing to accept a low starting wage even
though they have a large probability to receive one or more o¤ers today.
The various policies mentioned above can be interpreted in this framework as aiming at either
changing the shape of the search cost distribution or changing the marginal benets of search. For
example, one goal of subsidizing child care is to reduce the fraction of the labor force that does not
search at all, while counselling unemployed workers is likely to lower the cost of writing e¤ective
application letters and increase the mean number of job applications. Besides policies that aim to
directly a¤ect search intensity, redistribution policies like UI insurance and minimum wages also
a¤ect search intensity. Without a suitable framework there is no way we can tell whether we should
stimulate search intensity for all workers, only for particular groups or not at all. We nd that
1Hong and Shum (2006) are the rst to present structural methods to retrieve information on search costs in
consumer markets for homogeneous goods. Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) extend their approach to a richer setting
where price variation is not only caused by search frictions but also by quality di¤erences across products. The
estimation method here is similar to that in the consumer search model of Moraga-González and Wildenbeest (2006).
These models, however, are not directly applicable to the labor market since they do not capture the standard market
frictions associated to rationing.
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in the decentralized market equilibrium, too few workers participate in the labor market, while
unemployed workers on average send too many applications. There are two reasons for the latter
result. First, workers with very low search cost search too much relative to the social optimum
because they do not internalize the fact that sending more applications increases the probability
that multiple rms consider the same candidate. Second, search is partly a rent-seeking activity:
more applications increase the expected maximum wage o¤er. We show that the market equilibrium
output is about 15% to 20% lower than the socially optimal production. Since the planner increases
participation, he also wants to increase the number of rms relative to the market equilibrium.
However, given the optimal search strategies of the workers, entry is excessively large in the market
because rms basically have monopsony power.
Interestingly, the introduction of a binding minimum wage can be desirable for 2 reasons: (i) it
increases participation because the expected wage increases, (ii) it decreases rent seeking behavior,
because it compresses the wage distribution. Besides this, it reduces vacancy supply which has
ambiguous welfare e¤ects. We model UI benets to be conditional on searching at least once (as
is the case for many OECD countries).2 We argue that the advantage of this is that it increases
the marginal benets of sending one application rather than zero by a lot, but at the same time it
does not give additional incentives to search more often, which keeps the negative congestion e¤ects
low. UI benets therefore also increase participation without increasing rent seeking behavior. A
nal and important lesson from our analysis is that increasing participation or stimulating vacancy
creation in isolation have very small welfare e¤ects: the large welfare gains come from the interaction
of both. It can therefore be restrictive to evaluate separate labor market policies in isolation as is
commonly done.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model and section 3 shows
how it can be estimated by maximum likelihood. Section 4 discusses our data and in section 5 we
present our estimation results and discuss e¢ ciency. Section 6 checks how robust the optimal policy
is to relaxation of our simplifying assumptions. Section 7 discusses related literature and section 8
concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Setting
Consider a discrete-time labor market with a continuum of identical rms and identical, innitely-
lived workers. Both are risk neutral. We denote the measure of rms by NF and we normalize the
measure of workers to 1. We allow for free entry of rms, soNF is endogenous. At each point in time,
each worker is either employed at one of the rms or non-employed. The fractions of employed and
non-employed workers at time t are denoted by et and et respectively, where et + et = 1. Likewise,
each job is either matched with a worker or vacant. The fraction of rms with vacancies is denoted
2Formally, in order to be eligible for UI benets in the Netherlands, workers must apply four times per month
where an application is dened broadly, i.e. making a phone call also often qualies. In this paper we consider the
much smaller set of serious applications that could potentially lead to a job o¤er.
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by vt. Employed workers stay in their job until their match with the rm gets destroyed by some
exogenous shock; after this the workers in question ow into non-employment and the jobs become
vacant. We assume that a fraction  of the matches is destroyed every period.
In our model, non-employed workers can decide whether they want to search for a job or not.
This provides us with a meaningful distinction between unemployment and non-participation. The
non-participants are the non-employed workers who decide not to search because it is too costly,
while the unemployed are workers who happen to search at least once but fail to get a job. We
discuss this in more detail below. In each period a fraction mW of the non-employed workers ows
to employment and a fraction mF of the vacancies gets lled. The fractions mW and mF are
endogenous in our model and we will derive an expression for them in the next subsections. We
make the usual assumption that the labor market is in steady state, meaning that the fraction of
workers and rms in each state is constant over time, i.e. et = e and vt = v 8t, where e and v are
given by
e =
mW
mW + 
(1)
and
v =

mF + 
: (2)
A worker who is employed in a given period receives a wage w. The payo¤ to the rm giving
employment to the worker equals y   k   w, i.e. the di¤erence between the value of the output
produced, y, a capital cost k and the wage paid to the worker. Non-participants have a payo¤
that is determined by two components: the value of their home production and the value of their
leisure. We assume that, together, these amount to a quantity denoted by h. An unemployed
worker additionally receives unemployment (UI) benets denoted by b. These benets along with
the option value of search determine the workers reservation wage wR. Firms with an unlled
vacancy do not produce, but still have to pay the capital cost. Their payo¤ therefore equals  k.
All agents discount future payo¤s at rate 1=(1 + r).
We assume that a worker applies to jobs at the beginning of a period, but only learns whether
she is accepted or not at the end of the period. Consequently, workers might want to send several
applications simultaneously in order to reduce the risk of remaining unmatched. We allow workers
to choose the number of applications, a; that they want to send. Because of computational consid-
erations, we impose a maximum S on the number of jobs to which a worker can apply in a given
period. Since S can be any nite number, this assumption is hardly restrictive.
Next, we turn to the search cost. We assume that for each application the worker incurs a search
cost c > 0. The total cost of sending a applications therefore equals C (a) = ca.3 The search cost per
application, c; di¤ers amongst workers, but is drawn from a common, non-degenerate distribution
Fc (c), dened over the set [0;1). One very useful simplication we make is that workers draw a new
search cost parameter every period. This captures the idea that the opportunity cost of job search
3 In section 6.3 we consider the general class of search cost functions C (a) that are weakly increasing in a and
we show that the main conclusions in terms of the di¤erence between the desired and the actual distribution of
applications per worker do not change much from the linear benchmark case that we consider here.
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is a random variable that is a¤ected by things like having kids, health status, etc. The benet
of this assumption is that the reservation wage is the same for all workers. If we, alternatively
did assume search cost to be worker specic, we would have to calculate search-cost-dependent
reservation wages and this would make the model a lot more complicated. Since we only need the
cross-sectional search cost distribution we choose the simple option.4
In related models of consumer search, e.g. Burdett and Judd (1983) and Moraga-González and
Wildenbeest (2006), there usually is no rationing and each buyer is served. In a labor market
model, the assumption of no rationing is unrealistic: rms typically hire only one or a few of the
applicants for a certain job. To allow for rationing we assume an urn-ball matching function, that
allows for multiple applications as in Albrecht, Tan, Gautier and Vroman (2004). The matching
and wage determination process is as in Gautier and Moraga-González (2004):
1. Workers draw a search cost c, decide to how many jobs they wish to apply for and send their
job application letters to random vacancies.
2. Each vacancy receiving at least one application selects a candidate randomly and o¤ers her
a job with a wage w. Applications that are not selected are returned as rejections.
3. Workers that receive one or more wage o¤ers accept the highest one as long as it is higher
than the reservation wage. Other wage o¤ers are rejected.
The number of job applications workers send out and the wages rms set are determined in
a simultaneous-moves game. In the next subsections we discuss the workersand rmsoptimal
strategies. We focus on symmetric equilibria, i.e. where identical rms have similar strategies. In
the estimation procedure we use a sample of the ow from non-employment to employment. This
allows us to focus on the wage distribution for newly hired workers and to ignore the job-to-job
transitions which are an additional source for wage dispersion (see Burdett and Mortensen (1998)).
This way we can isolate the search intensity contribution to wage dispersion and keep the model
tractable.
2.2 The workersproblem
The strategy of a worker with search cost c consists of a reservation wage wR and a number of job
applications a (c) that she sends out to the rms. Since workers are ex ante identical, the reservation
wage wR is the same for all workers. However, workers learn their search cost c before they start
applying to the vacancies, so di¤erent workers may send out di¤erent numbers of applications.
Denote the fraction of non-employed workers sending a applications by pa. For some of these
workers (a fraction p0), the search cost might be so high that it is not protable for them to search
4We do not want to claim that worker specic search cost are irrelevant. For example, some workers are per-
manently in a position to contact many employers, just because they have a good network of contacts, or because
they live in a location with many job opportunities, or because they possess the desirable social skills and working
abilities.
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even once in this period. These workers become non-participants. The other workers (fraction
1  p0) send at least one application and are therefore considered to be unemployed. Let u and n
be the steady state fractions of unemployed and non-participating workers in the population, then:
n = p0(1  e) (3)
and
u = (1  p0) (1  e):
Since search is random, all rms are equally likely to receive applications from the unemployed
workers. This implies that the expected number of applications per vacancy is equal to the total
number of applications divided by the number of vacancies:
 =
(1  e)PSa=1 apa
vNF
=
PS
a=1 apa

; (4)
where v is the fraction of rms with vacancies and  = vNF =(1 e) denotes labor market tightness.
Due to the innite size of the labor market, the actual number of applicants at a specic vacancy
follows a Poisson distribution with mean .5 Likewise, the number of competitors that a worker
faces at a given rm also follows a Poisson distribution with mean . In case an individual worker
competes with i other applicants for the job of a rm, the probability that the individual in question
will get the job equals 1=(1 + i). Therefore, the probability  that an application results in a job
o¤er equals
 =
1X
i=0
1
i+ 1
exp ( )i
i!
=
1

(1  exp ( )) : (5)
We assume that if two or more rms compete for the same worker, the worker picks the highest
wage and the other rms have to open a new vacancy in the next period as in Albrecht et al. (2004).
Given the assumptions above, the number of wage o¤ers that a worker receives follows a binomial
distribution.6 More precisely, for a worker who sends a applications the probability  (jja) to get
j job o¤ers equals
 (jja) =
(  
a
j

 j (1   )a j if j 2 f0; 1; :::; ag
0 otherwise
(6)
We denote the fraction of non-employed workers that receive j job o¤ers by qj . This fraction is
equal to the product of pa (i.e. the fraction of non-employed workers sending a applications) and
5This is not completely obvious because in a nite labor market more matches are realized for a given mean search
intensity when the variance is zero. The key intuition why the number of applicants follows a Poisson distribution in
the limit and why all that matters is the average search intensity is that the probability that any two workers compete
for the same job more than once is zero when workers apply to a nite number of jobs. Consequently, the event that
application i results in a job o¤er only depends on labor market tightness and the total number of applications, and
is independent of the event that application j results in a job o¤er.
6See Albrecht et al. (2006)
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the probability that these a applications result in exactly j job o¤ers, summed over all possible a:
qj =
SX
a=j
 (jja) pa: (7)
This notation allows us to give a simple expression for the matching probability mW that a non-
employed worker ows into employment in the next period:
mW = 1  q0 = 1 
SX
a=0
pa(1   )a: (8)
In order to derive an expression for the reservation wage we specify two discrete time Bellman
equations. The rst one denes VE (w), i.e. the expected discounted lifetime income of a worker
who is currently employed at a wage w:
VE (w) = w +
1
1 + r
((1  )VE (w) + VNE) ; (9)
where VNE denotes the expected value of being non-employed. Hence, the value of employment
equals the sum of the wage w and the discounted value of employment if the worker stays in the
job next period (probability 1   ) or the discounted value of non-employment if the match with
the rm gets destroyed (probability ).
Non-employed workers face a trade-o¤ when deciding how many job applications to send out.
Applying to one more job is costly but it brings two sorts of benets: one, it reduces the probability
of remaining unmatched and two, it increases the likelihood to get a better paid job. Therefore, a
non-employed worker with search cost c chooses the number of applications a in such a way that
she maximizes her expected discounted lifetime payo¤ VNE(c):
VNE(c) = h+max
a
0@Ia>0b+ 1
1 + r
0@ aX
j=1
 (jja)
Z 1
0
max fVNE ; VE(w)g dF jw (w) +  (0ja)VNE
1A  ca
1A :
(10)
This expression describes the value of non-employment for a worker with search cost c, which equals
the sum of home production h and the expected discounted payo¤ of her optimal search strategy.
If the worker sends a applications, then she receives j wage o¤ers with probability  (jja). Each
wage o¤er w is a random draw from a wage o¤er distribution Fw with corresponding density fw.7
In case the worker receives multiple job o¤ers, she accepts the best one as long as that o¤er gives
her a higher payo¤ than remaining non-employed. If the worker fails to nd a job, she remains
non-employed again in the next period. A necessary condition to receive UI benets b is to actively
search for a job (represented by the indicator function Ia>0), as is the case in most OECD countries.
The total cost of sending a applications equals ca.
Ex ante, the non-employed workers do not know the value of the search cost that they will
7We derive this wage o¤er distribution in the next subsection.
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draw. Their expected value of non-employment is therefore equal to
VNE =
Z 1
0
VNE(c)dFc (c) : (11)
By evaluating equation (9) in wR and using the reservation wage property VE(wR) = VNE , it follows
that
VNE =
1 + r
r
wR: (12)
Substituting this expression back in (9) and rewriting gives
VE(w) =
1 + r
r + 

w +
wR
r

: (13)
Next, we combine equations (10) to (13) to obtain an implicit expression for the workers reservation
wage.
wR = h+
Z 1
0
max
a
0@Ia>0b+ 1
r + 
aX
j=1
 (jja)
Z 1
wR
(w   wR) dF jw (w)  ca
1A dFc (c) . (14)
The reservation wage depends on the value of home production and the option value of search. One
can easily show that this expression for the reservation wage satises Blackwells (1965) su¢ cient
conditions for a contraction mapping. Therefore, a unique value for the reservation wage wR exists.
Let  (jja) be the probability to receive j o¤ers conditional on sending a applications, given by
(6). Then, the expected benets of applying to a jobs is:
a =
aX
j=1
 (jja)
Z 1
wR
(w   wR) dF jw (w) : (15)
A worker with j o¤ers receives the expected maximum of j draws from the wage o¤er distribution
F (w), but she has to give up the value of being non-employed, i.e. wR. In order to derive which
fraction of the workers applies to 0; 1; :::; S jobs, we rst determine the expected gains from searching
one additional time. We denote this increment by  a. From the expressions above, it follows that
 a is equal to
 1 =
1
r + 
1 + b (16a)
 a =
1
r + 
(a   a 1) ; a = 2; :::; S; (16b)
where the rst terms on the right-hand sides of (16a) and (16b) reect the expected wage increase of
an additional job application. The second term of equation (16a) reects that the worker becomes
eligible to unemployment benets b, when she searches once instead of being a non-participant. It
is straightforward to show that  a is a decreasing function of a. This implies that workers continue
searching as long as  a is larger than their search cost c. Hence, the fractions pa satisfy the following
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conditions:
p0 = 1  Fc ( 1) (17a)
pa = Fc ( a)  Fc ( a+1) ; a = 1; 2; :::; S   1 (17b)
pS = Fc ( S) (17c)
2.3 The rmsproblem
In this subsection we derive the wage o¤er distribution for newly hired workers. A rm with a
vacancy o¤ers one randomly picked applicant (if present) a wage w. In order to be attractive to
both the rm and the applicant, this wage should be higher than the workers reservation wage
wR, but lower than the value of the output that will be produced in case of a match net of capital
cost, by = y   k. Moreover, the wage has to be higher than the legal minimum wage wmin. Dene
w = max fwR; wming. The rm faces a trade-o¤ within the interval [w; y   k]: posting a lower wage
increases its payo¤ y   k   w conditional on the worker accepting the o¤er, but it also increases
the probability that the worker rejects the o¤er and chooses to work for another rm.
For reasons similar to those in Burdett and Judd (1983) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998),
there exists no symmetric pure strategy wage equilibrium.8 However, there exists a mixed strategy
equilibrium in wage o¤ers to newly hired workers. Let Fw denote the equilibrium wage distribution.
A rm that o¤ers the lower bound of this distribution only attracts workers without other o¤ers.
Firms that o¤er wages below w will never hire workers. Therefore, the lower bound of the wage
distribution must be equal to w. The expected payo¤ for a rm o¤ering w, denoted by  (w), equals
the product of y   k w and the probability that the rm o¤ers the job to a worker who does not
receive job o¤ers from other rms:
 (w) = (y   k   w) 1

q1: (18)
In general, the expected payo¤  (w) to a rm o¤ering a wage w to an applicant is equal to the
product of y   k   w and the probability that all other o¤ers the applicant receives, if any, quote
a lower wage9:
 (w) = (y   k   w) 1

SX
j=1
jqjF
j 1
w (w) : (19)
In equilibrium, each wage in the support of Fw must yield the same level of expected prots to a
rm. Therefore, equating (18) and (19) gives an equal prot condition that implicitly denes the
8To be precise, in Burdett and Judds (1983) nonsequential search model there is a pure-strategy equilibrium
where workers are o¤ered the minimum wage. This type of equilibrium is non-generic in the sense that it can only
exist for particular search cost distributions.
9See appendix A.1 for a derivation.
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equilibrium wage distribution Fw:
SX
j=1
jqjF
j 1
w (w) = q1
y   k   w
y   k   w: (20)
Evaluating (20) at the upper bound w; where Fw (w) = 1, gives :
w = y   k   (y   k   w) q1PS
j=1 jqj
; (21)
which is strictly smaller than y, since q1 > 0. Hence, rms never post wages up to the productivity
level. After all, that would give the rm a payo¤ of zero with probability one, while posting a
lower wage gives a strictly positive expected payo¤, since some applicants do not compare wages.
In Appendix A.2 we give an expression for the density function of posted wages fw.
As noted above, the matching probability of a rm depends on its wage o¤er to the applicant.
Given a wage o¤er w, the matching rate is equal to
mF (w) =
1

SX
j=1
jqjF
j 1
w (w) : (22)
Therefore, the probability to hire a worker at wage w equals the probability of o¤ering the job to
a worker who happens to get no job o¤ers or only o¤ers paying less than w. An expression for the
ex ante matching probability mF (before drawing a wage from the wage o¤er distribution) can be
derived by integrating equation (22) over the support of Fw (w). This yields
mF =
mw

;
where mW = 1   q0 which is given by (8). These equations show that the matching rates are
completely endogenous and impose more structure on the model than most other search models
that consider an exogenously specied matching function or job o¤er arrival rate.
Finally, we can derive the rms value functions, which determine the extent of entry in the
market. A rm that is matched to a worker produces output y and has to pay a capital cost k
and a wage w. In the next period, the rm is still active with probability 1  ; otherwise it has a
vacancy again. Hence, the rms value VF (w) of being matched with a worker earning a wage w is
given by
VF (w) = y   w   k + 1
1 + r
((1  )VF (w) + VV ) : (23)
where VV denotes the lifetime payo¤ of a vacancy. A rm that has a vacancy incurs the capital cost
k, but does not produce. If the rm o¤ers a wage w, it matches with probability mF (w), resulting
in a value VF (w) in the next period. If the rm does not match (probability 1  mF (w)) it gets
VV again. Hence, VV equals
VV =  k + 1
1 + r
Z w
w
(mF (w)VF (w) + (1 mF (w))VV ) dFw (w)

: (24)
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We assume free entry of vacancies, i.e. unmatched rms enter the market as long as the expected
payo¤ is positive. Hence, in equilibrium it must be the case that VV = 0. Substituting this condition
into equation (23) and solving for VF (w) gives
VF (w) =
1 + r
r + 
(y   w   k) :
We now note that as a result of the constancy-of-prots condition we can write mF (w)VF (w) as
mF (w)VF (w) =
1 + r
r + 
 (w) =
1 + r
r + 
1

q1 (y   k   w) : (25)
Substituting (25) in (24) and using the free entry condition VV = 0 yields
0 =  k + 1
r + 
1

q1 (y   k   w) : (26)
This expression implicitly determines the free-entry equilibrium number of rms in the market.
2.4 E¢ ciency
An interesting policy question is whether the market is e¢ cient. To answer this question we consider
a social planner that can decide how many rms enter the market and how many vacancies a worker
should apply for. We distinguish two di¤erent cases: (i) a social planner that is constrained in the
sense that he cannot solve the coordination frictions in the market and (ii) an unconstrained planner
who can match any specic worker and rm. So, the constrained planner faces the same matching
function as the market, which was given in equation (8) and an unconstrained planner generates
a number of matches that equals the minimum of the number of unemployed and the number of
vacancies.
mUW =
min fu; vNF g
1  e :
This allows us to decompose the e¢ ciency loss in the economy into a part that is directly due to
frictions and a part that is due to distorted incentives. The aim of the social planner is to maximize
total discounted future output, net of application and entry costs. Suppose that in period t, NF;t
rms are present in the market and that the workers apply according to fp0;t; p1;t; :::; pS;tg. These
parameters imply values for t,  t, mW;t analogous to the equations derived in section 2.2. Then,
given employment et at time t, the matching technology implies that the the employment level in
the next period is given by:
et+1 = et (1  ) +mW;t (1  et) :
In each period the employed workers produce y, while the non-employed produce h and incur
the search cost c for each application they send. Note that if the planner wants a group of workers to
search S times, it is optimal to let this group consist of the individuals with the lowest search costs.
Similarly, the workers that should not search at all are the ones with the highest search costs.
Therefore, there is a one-to-one relationship between the set fp0;t; p1;t; :::; pS;tg and the function
at (c) which assigns the optimal number of applications to an individual with search cost c. Each of
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the NF;t rms present in the market has to pay the capital cost k. Hence, the Lagrangian is given
by
L
 fp0;t; :::; pS;t; NF;tg1t=0 = 1X
t=0

1
1 + r
t
ety + (1  et)

h 
Z 1
0
at (c) cdFc(c)

 NF;tk

+ t (et+1   et + et  mW;t (1  et)) ;
where t denotes the Lagrange multiplier for period t. If we restrict ourselves to the steady state,
this problem reduces to maximizing per-period output:
 = max
p0;:::;pS ;NF

mW
 +mW
y +

 +mW

h 
Z
a (c) cdFc (c)

 NFk

; (27)
subject to the conditions
PS
a=0 pa = 1, pa 2 [0; 1] 8a, and NF  0.10 Since our estimation method
provides us with estimates of y, h, and Fc(c), we can numerically solve this maximization problem
and confront the market outcome with the social optimum. We do this in section 5.3.
3 Maximum likelihood estimation
3.1 Likelihood
The model described in the previous section can be estimated by maximum likelihood. In this
section we provide a short sketch of the estimation procedure. For more details we refer to appendix
A.2. We show how we can obtain estimates for fp0; :::; pSg, which in turn provide us with the cuto¤
points f 1; :::; Sg of the search cost distribution. We start by discussing the data that are required
to estimate the model. First of all, we need cross-sectional wage data for newly hired workers who
enter from unemployment. Our source for this sort of information is the Dutch AVO data set,
which contains information on the Dutch Labor market. We discuss this data set in more detail in
section 4. Secondly, we need some aggregate statistics on the labor market. In particular, we need
information about the number of vacancies vNF in the market and about the fractions of employed
(e), unemployed (u) and non-participating (n = 1  e  u) individuals. Accurate data to estimate
these variables are available from most statistical agencies and they are usually not only available
for the labor market as a whole, but also for submarkets. Third, we need information about the
level of the unemployment benets to calculate household production. The unemployment benets,
b; can, without loss of generality, be dened as the product of a replacement rate  and the average
wage. An estimate for  can easily be obtained from macro-data. Note that the replacement rate
 only changes the decomposition of the reservation wage into b and h. Therefore, the estimates
for fp0; :::; pSg do not depend on the value of .
Two other parameters have to be xed exogenously: the maximum number of applications per
period S and the discount factor 1=(1 + r). One can easily test whether the estimation results are
10Note that total discounted future output di¤ers from per-period output by a factor 1+r
r
. Since the factor is a
constant, omitting it does not a¤ect the optimal values for p0; :::; pS ; and NF .
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sensitive to the values chosen for these parameters, but in general this does not seem to be the case.
For example, S = 30 and S = 40 give very similar results, because the di¤erence in expected payo¤
between searching 30 or 40 times is negligible. Likewise, note that choosing a di¤erent value for
the interest rate only a¤ects the scale of the search cost distribution Fc (c).11 It does not change
the estimates of the search fractions pa, the job o¤er probability  , the job o¤er fractions qj , or the
net productivity by = y   k.
These parameters, the data, the structure of the model and the steady state assumption provide
us with all the information we need to estimate the search cost distribution. The rst step is to use
(3) to identify p0 as the ratio of the fraction of non-participants in the population to the fraction of
non-employed. The other fractions pa are estimated by maximizing the likelihood of the observed
wages.
Note that, as in many models with on-the-job search, cross-sectional wages are not representative
for the wages that are o¤ered by the rms, but only for the wages that are accepted by the workers.
High wage o¤ers are more likely to be accepted than low wage o¤ers, so the distributions of the
o¤ered wages and the accepted wages di¤er from each other. We denote the distribution of the
accepted wages by Gw (w) with associated density gw (w). Conditional on receiving at least one
job o¤er, a worker will only accept a wage that is lower than some value w if all the j o¤ers that
she receives after sending a applications are lower than w. This means that Gw (w) simply follows
from Fw (w) (see appendix A.2 for a derivation).
Flinn and Heckman (1982) and Kiefer and Neumann (1993) suggest to use the lowest wage and
the highest wage in the sample to estimate the lower end and the upper end of the support of the
wage o¤er distribution.12 Although this approach gives superconsistent estimates, we do not follow
this suggestion, since these order statistics are quite sensitive to outliers. Instead, we estimate
the net productivity by and the lower bound w as parameters in our maximum likelihood problem.
Together they imply a value for the upper bound w as was shown in equation (21). A small fraction
of the observations in our data set lies outside the interval [w;w]. We consider these observations
to be the result of measurement error. We incorporate this measurement error in our model in the
standard way (see e.g. Wolpin (1987)): the observed wage ew depends on the true wage w and a
multiplicative random error term " with a log-normal distribution with parameters  = 0 and 2 =
var(log (")). We will estimate the value of :
The density of the observed wages can now be obtained by integrating over all possible values
of the error term. Let g ew ( ew) denote this density, then the likelihood of the sample is equal to the
11Equation (16) shows that  a>1 =
1
r + 
(a   a 1), where i does not depend on r or . Doubling r+ therefore
halves these cuto¤ points. The e¤ect on  1 is slightly smaller, since  1 includes the constant b.
12See also Donald and Paarsch (1993) for a discussion of the use of order statistics to estimate the bounds of
distributions.
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product of g ew ( ewi) for each individual i.13 So, the maximum likelihood problem is given by
max
p1;:::;pS ;;w;by
1
N
NX
i=1
log g ew ( ewi) ; (28)
subject to the conditions
PS
a=0 pa = 1, pa 2 [0; 1] 8a and wmin  w  by. The derivations in the
appendix show that the productivity and the capital cost only enter the expression for g ew ( ewi) as
the di¤erence y   k. Hence, the productivity and the capital cost are not separately identied: we
can only obtain an estimate for the net productivity by. Ex post however, we can retrieve the value
for k from equation (26). Subsequently, the productivity y simply equals the sum of by and k.
As is common in these kind of models, the reservation wage is only identied if it exceeds the
minimum wage.14 In that case wR = w. Otherwise, we can only derive some bounds on wR (or
alternatively one has to make parametric assumptions). The upper bound in that situation is given
by w, while the lower bound is dened by equation (14) and the restriction h = 0. We discuss these
bounds in section 6.1.
The covariance matrix of the estimates is calculated by taking the inverse of the negative
Hessian matrix evaluated at the optimum. The standard errors of the other variables, e.g. qj , can
be calculated by using the delta method.
3.2 Goodness of t
In our model, the density of accepted wages gw (w) has a exible form: it can be strictly upward
sloping, but also hump-shaped. This is shown in gure 1, which displays the wage density for two
di¤erent search proles fp0; p1; :::; pSg while keeping the other parameters xed to some arbitrarily
chosen values (in particular, w = 0, y   k = 20,  = 1). If many workers search very little, then a
given rm with an applicant does not face much competition from other rms. As a result, a large
part of the probability mass is at low wages. Conversely, if enough workers send many applications,
then rms have an incentive to post relatively high wages as well. Hence, by choosing the right
values fp0; p1; :::; pSg we get a hump-shaped wage distribution. This exibility is an important
advantage compared to existing search models with identical workers and jobs, like for example
Burdett-Mortensen (1998). These models are unable to generate wage distributions similar to the
hump-shaped ones observed in real-world markets.
At rst it may seem that our model is so exible that we can t any distribution because we
basically have a polynomial of degree S. However, our model places a lot of structure on this
polynomial. First, fractions pa are probabilities and must therefore be non-negative and sum to 1.
Secondly, our explicit modelling of the contact process imposes restrictions on the relation between
fp0; p1; :::; pSg and fq0; q1; :::; qSg, see equation (7). For example, qj > 0 implies that qi > 0 for all
i < j. This imposes structure on the expected payo¤s of searching a times, see (15), which in turn
a¤ects the shape of Fw (w). Thirdly, the shape of Fw (w) is further restricted by the equal prot
13See the appendix for an expression for g ew ( ew) :
14Flinn and Heckman (1982) label this the recovarability problem.
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condition of rms, given in equation (20). Fourth, workers with multiple o¤ers choose the highest
wage, which imposes conditions on the relation between Fw (w) and Gw (w), see (30) in appendix
A.2.
Because of these restrictions, it is not obvious that our model can generate a good t. In the
empirical analysis, we assess the t of the model in three di¤erent ways. First of all, we compare
the wage distribution implied by the model to a kernel estimate and check whether they are close
to each other. This test alone is however not su¢ cient, since the maximum likelihood estimation
is designed to match the wage distribution. Therefore, we also evaluate the t by (i) comparing
the matching and the separation probabilities of the rms and workers predicted by the model
to the actual ones and (ii) by considering the value of . Judging the matching and separation
probabilities is relevant since it gives an indication whether the model can t the average durations
of unemployment and employment spells. The value of  provides a natural test on the t of the
model, because it indicates which degree of measurement error is required to get a good t of the
wage distribution. If we nd a very large value for , then a large part of the variation in the
data cannot be explained by the model, implying that the model performs relatively poor. If we
however nd a small value for the standard deviation, this can be seen as supporting evidence for
the model.
3.3 Search cost distribution
From the maximum likelihood estimates, we can derive cuto¤ points of the search cost distribution.
In appendix A.3 we show how we apply a change of variables to get a simplied expression of (15)
for a. The marginal gains from an additional application can then be calculated from (16), where
the equilibrium value for the separation rate  follows from the steady state condition given in
equation (1). The values of  a serve as cuto¤ points of the search cost distribution Fc (c), as is
shown in equation (17).
Figure 2 illustrates how the search cost distribution can be estimated from the observed wage
distribution for the simplifying case that wR = 0. Note rst that the expected maximum wage o¤er
a worker may receive when applying for a jobs, a, corresponds to a point on Gw (w) (panel 1).
The shape of Gw (w) determines the marginal benets of search,  a. For example, in a close-to-
competitive economy where workers are the scarce factor, most job applications result in an o¤er
so wages are close to net productivity. As a result, one should expect  1 to be very large and
 a>1 to be close to zero. Figure 2 shows that the marginal benets of applying to more than 1
job are positive but decreasing. A worker, realizing that her applications do not a¤ect the wage
distribution, takes  1; 2; :::; S as given and chooses her search intensity such that the marginal
gains of an additional application equal the marginal cost (panel 2). For example, if her search cost
equals clow in the second panel, then she should apply four times. If her search cost is chigh instead,
she should not search at all since the marginal gain of the rst application is already smaller than
the marginal cost.
An econometrician proceeds in exactly the opposite way. When he observes (or estimates) that
a fraction p0 of the workers does not search at all, he concludes that the search cost c of each
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of these individuals must have exceeded  1. This provides him with one point of the search cost
distribution Fc (c), i.e. p0 = 1 Fc( 1) (panel 3). Similarly, by taking for example Fc( 4) Fc( 5)
one obtains the fraction of workers with search costs such that if they search 4 times or less, the
marginal benets exceed the marginal cost but if they search 5 times, the marginal cost of search
exceeds the marginal benets. So, this determines the fraction of workers who search 4 times,
p4. In the estimation procedure, we start with the wage distribution which gives information on
the fraction of workers who received j o¤ers, qj . The structure of the model relates fq0; :::; qSg to
fp0; :::; pSg and implies values for the marginal benets of searching a times. The set fq0; :::; qSg is
chosen such that the wage o¤er distribution implied by the model is as similar as possible to the
observed one. Together, this procedure determines S points located on the search cost distribution.
Hence, if for example the di¤erence between  1 and  2 is large but p1 is nevertheless small, it
suggests that Fc(c) is at in that region.
In section 5.3, where we solve the social planners problem, we need the full distribution Fc (c).
An approximation of this distribution can be obtained by interpolating the S cuto¤ points. In this
paper, we use linear interpolation. Note that we also have to extrapolate the distribution, because
we do not know the distribution of the search costs among the non-participants. We only know
that for this group the search cost c is larger than  1, because otherwise they would have searched
at least once. However, for the social planner it makes a di¤erence whether the search cost of a
specic non-participant is only slightly higher than  1 or much higher. We start by using linear
extrapolation: we assume that the search cost distribution keeps increasing linearly for c >  1,
with the same slope as just before  1, until it reaches 1. In section 6.2 we relax this assumption by
considering bounds on the search cost of non-participants (also shown in panel 3).
Finally, solving the social planners problem requires values for unemployment benets b and
household production h. The value for b can be calculated from the replacement rate  and the
average wage. To be precise,
b = 
Z w
w
wdGw (w) :
This result together with (14) can be used to derive an estimate for h, which simply follows from
the di¤erence between the reservation wage and the option value of search.
4 Data and empirical issues
4.1 Parameters
We apply the model developed in the previous section to the Dutch labor market. The wage data
that we use for estimation are described in detail in the next subsection. Here, we rst explain
how we obtain estimates for the exogenous parameters. We start by setting the maximum number
of applications S equal to 30. As mentioned before, the estimation results are not sensitive to this
specic value.
We use data from Statistics Netherlands to get a value for the replacement rate . The Dutch
government spent 4075.5 million euros on UI benets in 2005. The stock of unemployed contained
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on average 305140 individuals in that year. Hence, on average 13350 euros were paid per individual.
Since the average income amounted to 33000 euros, we set the average replacement rate  equal to
0.40. This is exactly the same value that Hornstein et al. (2006) use for the US.
In order to determine a reasonable value for the discount factor r, we rst have to x the length
of a period in our model. For this, we rely on Van Ours and Ridder (1993), who study vacancy
durations. They nd that the time that elapses between posting and lling a vacancy conditional
on having candidates is about four months. Given an annual interest rate of 5%, this implies that
r = 0:0164. It is worth stressing that the length of a period does not a¤ect our estimates of the
search intensities pa, the probability of getting a job o¤er  , the fractions qj of workers getting j
o¤ers, or the net productivity by. It only a¤ects the discount rate, which in turn only rescales the
search cost distribution.
Values for the labor market statistics e, u, and n are also obtained from Statistics Netherlands.
Data for these parameters are available for each combination of calendar year, gender, education,
and age cohort. We use that information to calculate the values of p0 for our sample, taking into
account the composition of the sample. The number of vacancies vNF is calculated indirectly: it
equals the product of the average labor market tightness = (1  p0) (0.70 in our sample) and the
unemployment rate u. In section 4.4 we present the numerical values for these parameters.
4.2 AVO data set
The source for the wage data that we use in the empirical application is the AVO data set15 of
the Dutch Labor Inspectorate, which is part of the Ministry of Social A¤airs and Employment.
The data are collected annually from the administrative wage records of a sample of rms. The
sample period spans from 1992 to 2002. The sampling procedure consists of two stages. In October
of each year, rst a stratied sample of rms in the private sector is drawn from the Ministrys
rm register. The strata are based on industrial sector and rm size (measured by the number of
employees). In the second stage, workers are sampled from the administrative records of the rms.
Information is collected at two points in time: one year before the sampling date and the sampling
date itself. The number of workers sampled depends on the rm size, the number of workers who
are newly hired, who have stayed in their job or who have quit the rm, and the number of workers
covered by collective labor agreements. The data set contains sampling weights for both the rm
strata and the employees. For the rm the weight is equal to the inverse of the probability that
the rm is sampled, while for the workers it corresponds to the inverse of the probability that the
worker was selected from all employees at the rm. Multiplying these values gives the weight that
can be used to calculate sample statistics for the workers.
A consequence of the sampling design is that we do not observe ows that occur between the
two sampling dates. Our assumption that the length of one period in the model equals four months
implies that we only observe the time points t = 0; 3; 6::: in the AVO data set. Workers may have
experienced other employment and unemployment spells between these moments of observation.
15AVO is the Dutch acronym for Terms of Employment Study.
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Note that this is not a major problem for our analysis. The only assumption we must make is that
the exact moment at which a newly hired worker entered his job does not a¤ect his wage at the
sampling date. This assumption seems very reasonable, given the fact that workers in general get
salary increases only once a year.
A big advantage of this administrative data set compared to survey data is its precision. Miss-
ing values are rare and some variables are observed in great detail.16 For example, the data set
distinguishes seven di¤erent wage components, which together add up to the total compensation for
the worker. These components include, besides the basic wage, also personal bonuses, commuting
allowances and the monetary value of wage in kind. In our study, we do not need the exact division
of the wage, but the fact that all these components are reported allows us to determine the total
payo¤ of each worker.
Besides the wage information the data set also contains background characteristics of both
workers and jobs. For example, we know the gender of the individual and her age and educational
level. For the educational level of a worker, the survey reports the highest diploma obtained. We
transform this into years of completed education using the design of the Dutch schooling system.
With respect to the nature of the jobs, information is available on sector of industry, rm size
and type of occupation. Sectors are coded according to the Dutch National Industrial Activity
Classication (SBI93) of Statistics Netherlands which is roughly similar to the SIC classication.
Firm size is measured by the number of employees of the rm at the sampling moment and the
occupation variable distinguishes between seven types of jobs.
Furthermore, we observe what type of contract a worker has. Most workers are covered by a
collective employment agreement (CAO), which is bargained over at the sector level, or by some
leading rms within the sector. The Minister of Social A¤airs and Employment can declare this
agreement legally binding for all other rms in the same sector, implying that these rms must o¤er
the same terms of employment to its employees. This is labelled AVV. Some large companies have
their own collective employment agreement. Finally, there are also workers who have a bilateral
bargained wage contract. These workers are typically employed at higher positions in the rm.
It is important to note that the existence of collective labor agreements does not rule out wage
dispersion. A typical collective labor agreement provides many di¤erent salary scales and to a
large extent rms can determine themselves according to which salary scale they will pay the newly
hired worker. Furthermore, rms can also use bonuses and allowances to pay a worker a salary
that exceeds the CAO wages.
A last important variable measures the job level on an eight-point scale. The lowest value (1)
corresponds to jobs that consist of "very simple, continuously repeating activities, for which no
education and only a little experience is required and which are performed under direct supervision".
At the other end of the spectrum, the highest job level (8) implies "managing large companies or
comparable departments or organizations " (Venema, Faas and Samadhan, 2003). The number of
16Nevertheless, some measurement error seems present in the data. We discuss this topic in more detail in subsection
4.4.
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observations in job level 7 and 8 is relatively small. Therefore, we combine these workers with the
ones in job level 6.
For our analysis, we select the workers who ow from unemployment to employment. As
argued before, we can isolate the contribution of search frictions to wage dispersion in this way. We
further restrict the sample by focussing on workers with an almost full-time job. More precisely, we
select all workers who work for at least 32 hours per week, which corresponds to 80% of a typical
working week of 40 hours. The rationale for this selection is that the behavior of part-time workers
might di¤er substantially from the behavior that we try to describe in our model. Moreover, the
labor markets for part-time and full-time jobs are almost completely separated in the Netherlands,
implying that these two groups of workers hardly compete with each other for a job. We also
exclude individuals below 23 years of age and above 65 years. Individuals above 65 face mandatory
retirement and a lower minimum wage applies to workers below 23 years of age. Hence, both groups
cannot be considered to be identical to the rest of the workers.
Because of missing variables, we cannot use the samples of 1992 to 1995 and 1999. Hence, we
use data from six waves (1996 to 1998 and 2000 to 2002). We correct the wage data for ination
by using a wage index and calculate the hourly wage for each worker by dividing her monthly wage
by the number of hours worked. In section 4.4 we give some descriptive statistics of the sample,
but rst we describe in the next subsection how we partition the labor market into ve segments.
4.3 Segments
In the theoretical model we make two important assumptions about the labor market. First,
we assume that, apart from measurement error, di¤erences in search cost are the only source
of wage dispersion amongst individuals. Secondly, we consider a labor market in which no new
workers can enter and in which the matching probability only depends on the strategy of the
agents that are present in the market. In reality, workers obviously earn di¤erent wages for many
reasons. Therefore, we rst create approximately homogeneous segments correcting for observed
heterogeneity and then we assume that our model suits each of those segments. The more segments
one creates, the more homogeneous the workers in a given segment will be; however, at the same
time, the assumption that we do not allow the best worker in segment i to compete with the worst
worker in segment i + 1 becomes more restrictive. As a compromise, we construct ve segments.
We assume that these segments constitute separate labor markets within the economy and that
each worker and each rm is active in exactly one of the ve submarkets. Further, we assume that
within a segment all workers and all rms are homogeneous.
In order to create the segments, we construct a worker skill index Ls and a job-complexity
index Lc, as in Gautier and Teulings (2006). We create the skill index for the workers by regressing
the logarithm of an individuals wage wi, denoted by !i, on all his/her observable characteristics:
gender, years of education, years of working experience17 (also squared and cubed), interaction
17As common in literature, we dene work experience as a function of age and the years of schooling. To be precise,
we assume the following relation: experience = (age - years of education - 6) / 50, where rescaling is applied for
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terms, and year dummies. Similarly, the job-complexity index is created by regressing !i on dummy
variables for the sector, the type of contract for the job, the job level, the occupation type, and
year dummies. Appendix B provides details.
The estimation results of these regressions are displayed in table 1 and 2. The t is good and
most coe¢ cients are in line with what is usually found in Mincerian type wage regressions. For
example, an extra year of education increases log(wage) by 0.075 for school-leavers, but this e¤ect
is smaller for more experienced workers. In the job complexity regression, log(wage) is increasing in
the job level. The correlation between the skill level and the complexity level is 0.58. Hence, there
is positive assortative matching in the labor market: better skilled workers have more complex jobs.
We create the segments accordingly. A straightforward way of achieving this, is by dening:
(Ls; Lc) = LsLc:
Next, we dene the ve segments as the quantiles of (Ls; Lc).18
If we repeat the skill and the complexity regression for each of the segments separately, we
observe indeed that the segments are much more homogeneous than the labor market as a whole.
For example, performing the skill regression on the rst segment gives an R2 of only 0.048 while for
the whole sample it is 0.358. This means that only a negligible fraction of the wage dispersion in
this segment can be attributed to di¤erences in human capital factors like education and experience.
The complexity regression can explain a slightly larger part of the wage variation (R2 = 0:188), but
again considerably less than for the entire labor market (R2 = 0:475). The same conclusion holds
for the other segments. The only segment that calls for some circumspection in the interpretation
of the results is the fth. There the R2 values of the skill and the complexity regression are 0.222
and 0.256 respectively, implying that a larger part of the heterogeneity is not ltered out.
4.4 Descriptive statistics
In this subsection we present the labor market statistics that we use in the estimation of the model
as well as some descriptive statistics of the AVO data set. A rst issue is that we discard some
observations in order to prevent that our estimate of  is determined by outliers. Inspection of
the data shows that in each segment some individuals are earning either very low or very high
wages compared to other workers. It seems likely that the workers earning these wages are not
representative for the rest of the segment. They probably earn these very high or low wages for
reasons other than the intensity of search. For example, they might possess very specic skills or
we might just have misclassied them and put them in the wrong segment. Therefore, we calculate
the 10th percentile w0:1, the median w0:5 and the 90th percentile w0:9 of the wage distribution in
each segment and we delete observations that are smaller than w0:5  32 (w0:5   w0:1) or larger than
reasons of computational convenience.
18We have experimented with several other denitions of the segments as well. This did not change any of the
main conclusions. The advantage of this one above, for example, dening  as E[wjs; c] is that our measure is more
conservative in the sense that less wage variation within segments can be explained by observable characteristics.
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w0:5 +
3
2 (w0:9   w0:5).19
After discarding the outliers we still observe that a small but strictly positive fraction (between
0.7% and 1.9%) of the workers in the lowest three segments earns a wage that is lower than the legal
minimum wage, which equals 7.51 euros per hour. Given the strict enforcement of labor laws in the
Netherlands, it seems highly unlikely that these workers actually earn such a low wage. Therefore,
we interpret this phenomenon as evidence of reporting mistakes in either the monthly wage or in
the number of worked hours. Our model can easily deal with this, since we explicitly allow for
measurement error in the data.
The descriptive statistics of the Dutch labor market are displayed in table 3. As the table shows,
the labor market conditions are clearly increasing in the segment number. Compared to workers
in a lower segment, workers in a given segment are (i) more likely to be employed and (ii) more
likely to search for a job when non-employed. The table also presents the number of vacancies and
some characteristics of the wage distribution for each of the segments. As one would expect, the
average wage is strictly increasing in the segment index. In the next subsection we explore how
these stylized facts a¤ect the search strategy of the various types of workers and we estimate their
search cost distributions.
Table 4 presents some descriptive statistics of the AVO data set. The table lists the mean and
the standard deviation for several worker and job characteristics. A rst observation is that workers
in higher segments are better educated. The workers in segment 5 have on average completed almost
seven years of education more than the workers in segment 1. This di¤erence corresponds to more
than 80% and is strongly signicant. Higher segments contain relatively more men than women.
There are no large di¤erences in the average age across segments. Another observation is that
workers in the higher segments work more often in the service sector and less often in trade or
industry. The type of contract and the rm size seem relatively comparable across the segments.
5 Results
5.1 Market equilibrium
We estimate the model for each of the ve segments separately. The estimation results are shown
in table 5. To ease the reading, the fractions pa and qj that appear in the table are reported
conditional on searching at least once. A rst interesting observation with respect to the search
intensity probabilities is that on the one hand the rst and the second segment give similar results
and on the other hand segment 3, 4, and 5 are much alike. In the rst two segments, the majority of
the searchers sends out one job application per period. The remaining workers search almost always
twice. In the three highest segments, this pattern is reversed. Most individuals searching for a job
send out two applications, while a smaller group only searches once. In all ve segments, a small
fraction of the workers applies to many (i.e. 30) vacancies. The average number of applicants per
19 If observed wages were normally distributed, this procedure would lead to deleting 2.7% of the observations at
both the top and the bottom of the distribution. However, the wage distributions are skewed to the right and this
results in a removal of slightly more observations in the right tail (on average 3.8%) than in the left tail (1.4%).
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vacancy varies between 2.3 and 3.3. This results in a job o¤er probability between 29% and 39%,
implying that most workers get either zero or one job o¤er. Between 4% and 8% of the unemployed
receive 2 o¤ers.
We nd that both the productivity of a match y and the capital cost k are monotonically
increasing across segments. The net productivity y  k is also increasing, except between segments
2 and 3, but the di¤erence is only 0.8 and not statistically signicant. The net output produced
by a lled vacancy is 17.68 euros per hour in segment 1 and increases to 39.54 euros per hour in
segment 5. This is approximately 2 to 2.5 times the average wage in each segment, implying that
rms capture a considerable part of the total output. The estimate for the unemployment benets b
ranges from 3.60 euros per hour in the lowest segment to 6.26 euros per hour in the highest segment.
We nd that the legal minimum wage is binding in the two lowest segments, but not in the other
three. Hence, in these latter three segments we can identify the reservation wage and obtain an
estimate for h, the combined value of home production and utility derived from leisure. It turns
out that h is an important component of the reservation wage. The estimates are between 6.11 and
6.52 euros per hour, which corresponds to 60%-80% of the reservation wage. For segments 1 and
2, the minimum wage is binding and we can only identify an upper bound on the value of home
production.
Maximization of the likelihood also provides us with an estimate for the density of accepted
wages gw (w). This estimate can be used to calculate the expected wage EGw(w) [w]. The values
obtained in this way are also displayed in table 5. They are very close to the values found in the
data, which were presented in table 3. The expected wage o¤er EFw(w) [w] is always slightly lower,
reecting the fact that lower wage o¤ers are less likely to be accepted than higher ones.
Figure 3 provides a closer look at the t of the model. There we compare the estimate for g ew ( ew)
to a kernel estimate of the wage density.20 The gure shows that our model indeed matches the
wage distribution very well. We also formally test the t of the model by performing a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS) test.21 The values of the test statistic are shown in the last row of table 5. It turns
out that for segment 2 and 5 the test statistic is below the critical value 1.36. Hence, the test
does not reject the null hypothesis that the empirical cdf and the estimated cdf have the same
distribution in these two segments. In the other segments, the test statistic is signicant. This
is however a common nding in the estimation of search models with many observations (see e.g.
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2004)).
The estimated match probability mW for a non employed worker is lowest in segment 1 (3.6%)
and highest in segment 5 (7.5%). For the job destruction rate , we nd an opposite pattern.
It is highest in segment 1, where a fraction 3.9% of the matches is destroyed in each period, and
monotonically decreases to 1.1% in segment 5. Note that these are probabilities per period. In order
to check whether they match the actual probabilities, we convert them to annual values and we
average over the segments. Appendix C gives the details. We nd an annual aggregate matching
20We use a standard normal kernel with bandwith 1:06swn 1=5, where sw denotes the standard deviation of w.
21We calculate the KS statistic as 
p
N , where N is the number of observations and  is the maximum absolute
di¤erence between the estimated and the empirical distribution of the observed wages.
23
probability for the workers that equals 14.1%. The annual matching probability conditional on
search in the current period, implied by the model, is 50.1%. The annual aggregate ring probability
implied by the model is equal to 5.2%.
These values are close to values given by other sources. Data of Statistics Netherlands22 indicates
that of the non-employed workers at the end of 1999, 11.0% was employed one year later. Broersma,
den Butter and Kock (1998) report that over the period 1970-1995, the ow from unemployment to
employment divided by the stock of unemployment in the previous period is 55%.23 Van den Berg
and Van der Klaauw (2001) report three-month-unemployment-exit probabilities of 37%-45% for
1982-1994, which is roughly in line with our aggregate four-month-unemployment-exit probability
mW jU of 46.5%. The model also performs well for the job loss rate . Using again data of Statistics
Netherlands, we nd that of the employed workers at the end of 1999, 5.2% was non-employed after
a year. Our estimate matches this gure perfectly.
For rms we estimate matching probabilities, mF , to be between 61.3% and 71.5%. The
weighted average over the segments equals 66.9%. This value is in line with the matching proba-
bility given by Van Ours and Ridder (1992). Using Dutch survey data, they nd that 7% of the
reported vacancies had been lled four months later. Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000) nd
exactly the same value (but on a quarterly basis) for the US labor market. The matching rates
for rms and workers are variables that do not enter the likelihood function and consequently our
estimation procedure is not designed to match them. So it is encouraging to see that the predicted
values are close to the actual ones.
In order to determine to what extent the good t of the wage distribution depends on the
presence of measurement error, we judge the estimates for the standard deviation . We still nd
values between 0.007 (segment 2) and 0.074 (segment 5). The higher estimate of  in segment 5
is in line with the fact that we still found considerable heterogeneity there. However, in general we
can conclude that the degree of measurement error is small. The estimates for  are of the same
order of magnitude as the values found by Van den Berg and Ridder (1998), who nd standard
deviations of 0.022 and 0.045. Dey and Flinn (2005) argue that the degree of measurement error
that is required to provide a good t of the model to the data can be considered to be an index
of the degree of model misspecication. Such being the case, we conclude that our model gives an
adequate description of the labor market.
The good t is partly caused by the fact that our model allows the densities of accepted wages
to be hump-shaped (also if we estimate the model without measurement error). This feature
distinguishes our model from those described by, for example, Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and
Gautier and Moraga-González (2004) which imply increasing densities. Another interesting result
is that the wage distribution in each segment rst-order stochastically dominates the distributions
in all lower segments. Note that this was not directly visible in the raw data, where the lowest
wages in the third segment were lower than in the second segment. By retrieving the true wage
22http://statline.cbs.nl.
23This number is calculated from di¤erent tables in their paper as: (UO=U)  (Fue=U0) = 0:79  290=418 = 0:55,
where UO is total unemployment outow and Fue is the ow from unemployment to employment.
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distribution, our model reveals that this is only the result of measurement error. In gure 4 we
present the estimates for the search cost distributions. We nd that search costs (measured in the
same unit as the wages and the productivity) are in general higher in higher segments.
It is di¢ cult to obtain direct information on the number of applications that workers send out.
Van der Klaauw, Van Vuuren and Berkhout (2003) have information on this variable for university
graduates. The median number of applications per 4 months (one period in our model) in the
period before a job was found is between 4 and 5 while our model predicts that it is close to 2 in
the highest segment (which is the relevant one for university graduates).24 So for this particular
group we either underestimate the number of applications or overestimate the length of a period.
Remember however that we make the simplifying assumption in our model that each application
has an equal probability to be accepted while in reality workers may send some applications to jobs
that are far above or below their league. Those applications may have a much lower acceptance
probability, implying that the relevant number of applications is less than 4 per period.
5.2 Mean-min ratio
In a recent paper Hornstein, Krusell and Violante (2006, hereafter HKV) argue that a large class
of search and matching models is not able to explain the degree of wage dispersion that is observed
in reality. Since our model belongs to the same class, we check to what extent our ndings are
susceptible to this critique.
HKV discuss a specic measure of wage dispersion, which is dened as the ratio between the
average wage and the lowest wage paid to employed workers. They show that a closed form
expression for this mean-min ratio (Mm) can be obtained in a general class of search and matching
models, without making any parametric assumption on the wage o¤er distribution. As dened
before,  denotes the replacement rate, i.e. the ratio between b and the average wage. Then Mm
is given by
Mm =
1 + mWr+
+ mWr+
:
They calibrate their model with US data on mW and , which results in Mm = 1:036. However,
at the same time they nd that in US data sets with wage information the ratio between the
average wage and the reservation wage is typically about 1:70 or larger. From this, they conclude
that standard search models are not able to explain the observed combination of a low reservation
wage and a high matching rate for unemployed workers. A similar point was made in Gautier and
Teulings (2006) who focus on the ratio of the competitive and the reservation wage.25 They argue
that low unemployment rates imply small search frictions while substantial wage dispersion implies
large search frictions.
In order to check the performance of our model in jointly explaining observed unemployment
and wage dispersion, we set mW and  at the estimated values that we obtained in the previous
24We thank Aico van Vuuren for kindly giving us this information.
25They report substantially less wage dispersion than Hornstein et al. (2006). The di¤erence is due to the fact
that Gautier and Teulings correct for measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity.
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subsection, while keeping  at 0:4 and r at 0:016. Then, we calculate the mean-min ratio as
predicted by the market equilibrium and we compare this to what we observe in the data. The
results of this are given in table 6. If we follow HKV by taking the fth percentile of the wage
distribution (w5%) in each segment as the reservation wage, then the mean-min ratio in the data
varies between 1.215 (segment 1) and 1.598 (segment 5).26 Note that our model di¤ers in one
important respect from the standard search models that they discuss. We do not only consider
unemployed and employed workers, but we also allow workers to draw a high search cost such that
it is optimal to become a non-participant. This matters for the matching probability. If we ignore
the non-participants, we nd that the matching probability mW jU =
mW
1 p0 is between 0.4 and 0.5
per period. This implies a mean-min ratio MmU that varies between 1.037 (segment 5) and 1.073
(segment 1). Those values are very close to the one found by HKV.
In our model however, the unemployed workers are a selective subsample of the total group of
non-employed workers, namely the ones who happened to draw a low search cost in the current
period and therefore have a large probability to receive a job o¤er in this period. They realize
that in the next period they may draw a high search cost and they take this into account when
they determine their reservation wage. We nd that the mean-min ratio for the entire group
of non-employed workers, MmNE ; is between 1.190 (segment 5) and 1.572 (segment 1). Hence,
in our model where workers have a positive probability to become a non-participant in the next
period, a much larger part of wage dispersion can be explained by search frictions. The possibility
of becoming non-participant and consequently obtaining a very low matching rate in the next
period is consistent with a low reservation wage and a high transition rate from unemployment to
employment.27
5.3 E¢ ciency
To check whether the Dutch labor market is constrained e¢ cient, we solve the planners problem
for each of the ve segments. We use the estimates of the search cost distribution Fc (c), the
productivity y, the capital cost k and the home productivity h that we obtained above and maximize
equation (27). Note that in the lowest two segments, we cannot identify the exact value of h. In
those segments we set h = 6:11, the same value as in segment 3. The fact that h is almost the same
in segments 3, 4 and 5 makes this defendable. Nevertheless, in section 6 we drop this assumption
and calculate the planners solution for the bounds on h in segments 1 and 2. There, we also check
how sensitive our welfare analysis is to di¤erent search cost functions, and assumptions about the
search cost of the non-employed.
A priori there is no trivial answer to the question whether the number of applications sent
by workers in the market equilibrium is too high or too low from a social planners point of view.
26For optimal comparison with HKV, we do not throw away outliers here.
27 In Albrecht and Vroman (2006), UI benets fall over time. Their model is therefore also consistent with a low
unemployment rate and substantial wage dispersiont. In Albrecht and Axell (1984) workers are assumed to have
di¤erent values of leisure. If there is enough heterogeneity in reservation values but at the same time, most workers
accept most o¤ers, there can be low unemployment together with substantial wage dispersion.
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Workers might underinvest in search since they face a standard hold-up problem. They only receive
a part of the social benets of their investments in search and therefore too many workers with
high search cost may decide not to send applications. On the other hand, workers could also send
too many applications, since they only take into account their own expected payo¤ and ignore
the congestion e¤ects their applications cause in the market: if workers send multiple applications,
several rms might o¤er the job to the same worker, implying that all except one remain unmatched.
What about rm behavior? Albrecht et al. (2006) show that when all workers search two or
more times, e¢ cient entry requires full ex ante and full ex post (i.e. Bertrand) competition for
workers. This is not the case in our model. There is no full ex ante competition, since the rm
that o¤ers the lowest wage in the market receives as many applications as the other rms, and
there is no full ex post competition, because a rm that o¤ers the job to a worker with (an) other
o¤er(s) still has a positive expected payo¤. So, rms have too much market power making wages
too low and entry excessive. If, most workers search only once, as is the case here, vacancy supply
can be either too high or too low because of the standard congestion externalities. Opening a
vacancy is good for the workers but bad for the other rms. Below we show that if the planner
can jointly determine a(c) and the number of rms, he typically increases both vacancy supply
and the number of participants. But for the reasons mentioned above, we nd that if we impose
the planners participation level to the market, there would be too many vacancies opened in the
market.
Table 7 presents the key parameters of both the constrained and the unconstrained planners
solution for each of the segments. We observe three important di¤erences between the market
equilibrium and the constrained planners strategy. First, the planner wants a higher number of
rms to enter the labor market. The increase in entry is relatively small (8%) in segment 5, but
amounts to more than 50% in segment 1. Second, the planner increases participation since he
internalizes the hold-up problem: a considerable group of non-employed workers (15%-30%) must
search once rather than zero times. Finally, the planner decreases the number of workers sending
two or more applications. These workers (3%-10% of the non-employed) have low search costs,
which makes it protable for them to send so many applications. As described above however, they
do not to take into account that their large number of applications increases the probability that
multiple rms consider the same candidate, which is socially wasteful. Therefore, it is better if
they apply only once per period. For the unconstrained planner we nd optimal strategies that are
quite similar to the constrained planners solution, except that the unconstrained planner wants to
increase the participation of workers and the entry of rms even more.
Figure 6 displays the e¤ects of these changes in strategy on steady state employment, non-
participation, and unemployment. It shows that implementation of the constrained planners
solution would typically increase the employment rate, decrease non-participation and increase
unemployment. The increase in unemployment is a direct e¤ect of a higher participation rate:
when more workers search for a job, also a larger number will fail to nd one. The unconstrained
planner lowers both non-participation and unemployment.
Finally, table 7 reports the output that obtains every period in the market equilibrium as well
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as in the planners solution. We dene the e¢ ciency of the labor market as the ratio between
these two values. It turns out that the labor market is not fully e¢ cient. The constrained planner
generates a 15% to 20% higher output than the market, while the unconstrained planner does on
average about 40% better. This result allows us to divide the total e¢ ciency loss into a part caused
by wrong incentives and a part caused by coordination frictions. We nd that in the lowest 4
segments wrong incentives and coordination frictions respectively comprise about 45% and 55% of
the total ine¢ ciency. In the highest segment, wrong incentives explain a little bit more than half
(about 60%) of the ine¢ ciency.
It is important to stress that the ine¢ ciency results largely depend on the interaction between
participation of workers and entry of rms. If we did keep either search intensity or the number of
rms constant and let the constrained planner optimize over the other variable, then it would turn
out that the planner can hardly do better than the market (di¤erences are in the order of 1%). The
reason for this is that participation and rms entry are complementary. A larger number of active
rms encourages workersparticipation, which, in turn, makes it more attractive for rms to enter.
This implies that when one wants to estimate the e¤ect of, for example, an active labor market
program, it is crucial to take both factors into account. Otherwise, one will severely underestimate
the true e¤ects of the program. This also suggests that the common practice in the program
evaluation literature to study the e¤ects of policy changes in isolation can be very restrictive.
Our e¢ ciency results also shed new light on the desirability of a binding but moderate minimum
wage. It has the potential to reduce all three externalities that are present in our model. First, by
increasing the average wage it makes more workers search once rather than zero times, increasing
participation. Second, by compressing the wage distribution it reduces the incentives to search
more than once, decreasing rent seeking behavior and coordination frictions. Third, it reduces
monopsony power and excessive entry of vacancies. Unemployment benets that are conditional
on searching at least once have similar e¤ects. Simulations show that a marginal increase in either
the minimum wage of the UI benets is welfare improving.28
6 Robustness
In our main analysis we made some simplifying and arbitrary assumptions, namely: (i) the value of
household production in segments 1 and 2 that could not be identied (because the minimum wage
is binding there) is equal to the value of household production in segment 3, (ii) the irrecoverable
part of the search cost distribution for the non-participants can be obtained by linear extrapolation,
and (iii) the search cost functions C(a) are linear. To what extent do those arbitrary assumptions
a¤ect our main results? In order to investigate this we relax (i)-(iii) in the subsequent subsections.
28Due to numerical constraints we are not able to derive the socially optimal minimum wage or benet level.
Another reason to only consider marginal changes in the minimum wage or UI benets is that we cannot rule out
multiple equilibria. If we would consider large changes in those parameters, the model could jump to a di¤erent
equilibrium.
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6.1 Value of home production
In table 7 we xed household production h in the lowest two segments, where the minimum wage
was binding, to 6:11, i.e. the same value as in the third segment. Instead, we could use bounds
for h, where the lower bound is zero and the upper bound would be the value of h for which the
reservation wage is equal to the minimum wage, i.e. h = 7:08 for segment 1 and h = 6:74 for
segment 2. The di¤erent values for the household production inuence the estimated search cost
distributions, as is shown in gure 5. Not surprisingly, we nd that the estimated search costs are
higher for lower values of h. After all, lower values of h imply larger benets of search. In order
to have the same values p0; :::; pS (that maximize the likelihood) in equilibrium, the costs of search
must be higher as well in that case.
Hence, the value of h a¤ects the planners solution in two ways: directly by changing the
contribution of a non-employed worker to total output, and indirectly via the estimated search
cost distribution. Table 8 shows that the latter e¤ect dominates. The constrained planner sets p0
at a higher value for the lower bound of h than for the upper bound. The main conclusion that
participation should be increased and that a small fraction of workers sends too many applications
however remains. Furthermore, the e¢ ciency loss due to wrong incentives is similar to what was
found in table 7.29 We can conclude that the assumption about home production in the lowest two
segments does not a¤ect our main conclusions.
6.2 Search cost for non-participants
Since the search cost of workers who decide not to search are in principle irrecoverable, we made
a parametric assumption, namely that their search cost could be obtained by linear extrapolation.
In this subsection we relax this assumption by considering bounds for the search cost of non-
participants. The planner generates a higher output as the search cost of the non-participants is
lower. The upper bound to the planners solution is therefore obtained when all non-participants
have a search cost that is equal to  1, i.e. the marginal benet of the rst application. They
cannot have a lower search cost, since otherwise becoming a non-participant would not have been
an utility maximizing choice. On the other hand, the lower bound to the planners solution arises
when all non-participants have an innitely large search cost. Table 9 presents both bounds to
the constrained planners solution. In order to ease comparison, the table also displays again the
market equilibrium and the planners solution in case of linear extrapolation, as they were given in
table 7.
Not surprisingly, the planner keeps p0 equal to the value in the market equilibrium, when all
non-participants have innitely large search costs. Moreover, he changes the number of rms only
marginally in that case. Like in the linear case however, the planner does not want workers to
send more than one application. The average gain relative to the market equilibrium is about 10%,
which is not very di¤erent from the value found with linear extrapolation. If we assume that all
29Note that a change in h also a¤ects the calculated value for the market output. The relative di¤erence between
market and planners output is therefore the most informative measure.
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non-participants have search cost  1, then it is optimal for the planner to let everybody search
once (p1 = 1). He increases the number of rms to almost 1 in each of the segments. The gain
compared to the market now varies between 20% (segment 5) and almost 40% (segment 1 and 2).
In most segments, especially the higher ones, the minimum and maximum search cost case
that we consider provide reasonably narrow bounds on the planners solution. Moreover, both the
minimum and maximum case are actually unrealistically extreme. We know that in the labor market
non-participants with low and high search costs coexist. A large fraction of the non-participants is
unable to work for various reasons, like disability or because they follow an education. At the same
time however, certain non-participants can be considered to be marginally attached (MA) to the
labor force. Jones and Riddell (1999) show for example that a small fraction of the Canadian non-
participants has a positive probability to ow into employment30. Hence, the linear extrapolation
case, in which some non-participants have relatively low search cost, while others have high search
costs, describes the labor market a lot better than the two bounds. Nevertheless, it is encouraging
to see that the bounds, despite being unrealistically extreme, are reasonably close to this linear
case.
6.3 Search cost function
In section 2 we assumed that di¤erent workers can have di¤erent search costs but that the search
cost function is linear for all workers. So, we considered functions C(a) = ca, with c > 0. In
reality, this assumption might not hold. C (a) will be concave in a if workers invest a lot of time
in drafting the rst application letter but spend less time on the subsequent ones. On the other
hand, C (a) will be convex in a if workers have easy access to a small number of vacancies (e.g. via
their network of friends and colleagues), but have to search really hard to nd other job openings.
Because of this, we relax the linearity assumption in this subsection and consider a very general
class of search cost functions.
We allow di¤erent workers to have di¤erent shapes of the search cost function: in every period
each worker i draws a search cost function Ci (a) from a xed collection of search cost functions.
We only make two very weak assumptions about the shape of Ci (a): Ci (a) is (i) equal to zero
for a = 0 and (ii) weakly increasing in a. Although the workers know the collection of search cost
functions from which they draw, the econometrician does not observe this. Therefore, we have to
make one more assumption. Note that the collection of search cost functions does not directly enter
the maximum likelihood problem, but determines which sets of fp0; :::; pSg are feasible. Suppose
for example that each search cost function Ci (a) consists of a (stochastic) xed cost for the rst
application and that all other applications can be send for free. This would imply that workers
either send 0 or S applications and never 1; 2; :::; S  1 applications. Hence, only solutions in which
p0 + pS = 1 would be possible in that case. Since this solution generates a lower likelihood than
30 If those workers are included in unemployment they would consist of 25-30% of the unemployed. For the Nether-
lands, an upper bound estimate of the number of marginally attached workers is 7.5% of the labor force (calculated
as all non-disabled workers in 1999 below age 54 who are available, but not necessarily immediately, for 12 hours or
more, including school leavers, see Bijsterbosch and Nahuis (2000)).
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the solution that we obtain, this collection of search cost functions is not feasible.
In fact, no collection of search cost functions could generate a higher likelihood value than we
obtain, since our linear search cost functions did not restrict the set fp0; :::; pSg in any way. Hence,
we impose that the collection of search cost functions supports the ML estimates found in section 5.
This implies that we allow some workers to have a search cost function that consists of a xed cost
only, but not too many. Some workers must have a di¤erent search cost function (e.g. moderately
concave, linear or even convex). Otherwise, no worker would send one or two applications, while
the ML estimates indicate that we need a substantial amount of such workers in order to t the
data well.
This condition on the collection of search cost functions implies that the solution that we nd
for the market equilibrium does not change, because it maximizes (28) and remains feasible. The
planners solution will change, but it can be bounded. First, note that we can identify for a worker
who applied to ba > 0 jobs that the total cost she makes is below a certain threshold, namely the
sum of the marginal benets of searching ba times: Ci(ba) < xba = Pbal=1  l: Since the total search
costs are weakly increasing in a, the cost for this worker of searching a 2 f1; :::;ba  1g times is also
at least 0 and at most xba. Hence, unlike in the linear case, we cannot rule out that a worker who
sends 20 applications can pay more for sending 5 applications than a worker who actually sent 5
applications. Similarly for a > ba, the total search cost are at leastPal=ba+1  l: For example, consider
a worker who applied once and assume that the marginal benets of sending 2 applications is 15.
The total cost of sending 1 application must have been at least 0 and therefore the total cost of
sending 2 applications for this worker must be at least 15 (otherwise the worker would have sent
two applications).
For each segment we can now calculate a 31 by 31 matrix where cell ij contains the minimum
amount of search cost of sending j applications for a worker who has actually sent i applications.
We can do the same for the maximum search cost. Using those matrices, the planner can then
determine his solutions. Note that all workers now have di¤erent search costs than in the baseline
linear case. As a consequence, the option value of search changes, which results in a di¤erent
estimate for the value of home production.31 This does not a¤ect the market output, since the
change in h is exactly o¤set by the change in expected search costs in equilibrium. However, this
is not true for the planners solution. Hence, we let the planner take the new estimate for h into
account when he determines his solution. Table 10 gives the results and what strikes is that the
bounds are quite tight. In fact, they are very similar to the bounds found in table 9, where we only
relaxed the search cost of the non-participants.32
Obviously, we again nd that the lower the search costs are, the higher output is and the
smaller the desired fraction of non-participants p0 is. For the high search cost case, the planners
solution is close to the market equilibrium. The planner lets only a small fraction of the workers
search and it is optimal that some workers send two applications. The intuition for the latter result
31This was not the case in the previous subsection. There only the search costs of non-participants changed. Since
they do not search, the option value remains unchanged.
32The bounds are not necessarily wider than in table 9, because the value of h has changed.
31
is the following: since there are few searchers, the matching process makes the socially marginal
benets of sending two applications positive. Moreover, for the workers who send two applications
in equilibrium, the marginal cost of their second application is zero in the high search cost case. The
marginal social benets of sending three or more applications remain negative because of congestion
externalities, so the planner never lets workers search three or more times.33 In the low search cost
case, workers should not send two applications, because there are already many workers who send
one application and the expected queue length is such that the marginal social benets of two
applications are negative. Finally, in the high search cost case the planner lets the workers who
searched thirty times become non-participants. Letting these workers search once (as in the low
search cost case) is not a good strategy, since the (maximum) cost for them of applying once is the
same as the cost of applying thirty times.
We can conclude that if we consider a very general class of search frictions, the bounds on
the planners solution hardly change. Although the estimate of the value of home production
changes and although we can no longer conclude that it is never desirable that workers send out
more than one application, the main message remains that given our endogenous matching process,
participation is generally too low and unemployed workers should not send too many applications.
7 Related literature
In this section we relate our paper to the existing literature. First, our model is very similar to the
noisy search model of Burdett and Judd (1983) where (in labor market terminology) workers can
receive multiple o¤ers. As in Kandel and Simhorn (2002) we allow for the possibility that applica-
tions are rejected. We extend their model by endogenizing search intensity and the distribution of
job o¤ers. Since we allow for coordination frictions in the matching process, increasing the average
search intensity does not make the model converge to the Walrasian equilibrium like in their model.
Stern (1989) also estimates a simultaneous job search model but he has an exogenous wage o¤er
distribution.
Albrecht and Axell (1984) also get wage dispersion due to worker heterogeneity. Their het-
erogeneity is in terms of reservation wages while ours is in terms of search costs which gives us a
continuous rather than a discrete wage distribution. Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg (2000)
and Mortensen (2003) focus on heterogeneity on the rm side. Bontemps, Robin and Van den
Berg (1999) have heterogeneity on both the worker and rm side. Introducing rm heterogeneity
in the Burdett-Mortensen (1998) model of on-the-job search gives a good t of the wage distrib-
ution. All the introduced heterogeneity in the above mentioned papers is motivated by the fact
that wage data do not t the mixed-strategy wage distributions implied by the models. Burdett
and Mortensen (1998), Burdett and Judd (1983) and Gautier and Moraga-González (2004) all fail
33Albrecht et al. (2006) call this the second coordition problem: the more applications workers send, the larger
the probability that multiple rms consider the same candinate. This negative e¤ect of multiple applications can
outweight the reduction of the rst coordination problem (more applications make it less likely that a rm receives
no applications).
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to produce hump-shaped distributions. We show that simply allowing for ex post heterogeneity
in search cost gives a very good t of the wage distribution. Basically, the fat right tail within
a segment suggests that there is a small fraction of workers with low search cost, receiving many
o¤ers.
There are various models with endogenous search intensity. Benhabib and Bull (1983) consider
the optimal number of applications in a partial search model with an exogenous wage distribution
where, as in our model, workers take the highest o¤er. In Mortensen (1986), workers can increase
the job o¤er arrival rate by spending more time on search. Bloemen (2005) estimates this model and
Van der Klaauw, Van Vuuren and Berkhout (2003) estimate an extension of this model on a sample
of university graduates where they allow search intensity before graduation to be time-varying.
Christensen et al. (2005) estimate a wage posting model where workers can make investments
to increase the job o¤er arrival rate. The congestion externalities of multiple applications that
are present in our model are absent in their model. Albrecht et al. (2004) derive a matching
function with multiple applications. More applications make it less likely that a vacancy has no
applicants but more likely that multiple rms consider the same candidate.34 The matching rate
is determined by the interaction between those coordination frictions. The aggregate matching
function is typically rst increasing and then decreasing in average search intensity. This paper
extends this matching framework by allowing for heterogeneity in search cost and is the rst one
which estimates it simultaneously with the wage distribution. This is important for policy analysis
because wage policies a¤ect search intensity and policies that a¤ect search intensity will also a¤ect
the wage distribution.
In principle, our model allows a non-employed worker to be in any of 30 di¤erent search states,
each referring to the number of applications she sends. In the macro search literature, the focus has
been more on the distinction between participation and non-participation. We have dened non-
participation as workers who do not apply to any job but one could alternatively make a distinction
between workers sending many or few applications. For simplicity we only consider heterogeneity in
search cost to drive participation and search intensity but in Pries and Rogerson (2004) variations
in market productivity drive the participation decision while in Pissarides (2000) and Garibaldi
and Wasmer (2005) variations in home productivity determine participation. In Frijters and Van
der Klaauw (2006), (true) duration dependence of unemployment can push the reservation wage
below the value of home production.
There are many other structural estimates of search models, we mention just a few. Besides the
ones mentioned above, Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) have estimated the Albrecht-Axell model, Van
den Berg and Ridder (1998) estimate the Burdett-Mortensen model and Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2004) estimate an on-the-job search model with Bertrand competition between the poaching and
the incumbent rm. To our knowledge, there does not exist previous work estimating a labor market
version of the Burdett and Judd (1983) model with rationing as in Gautier and Moraga-González
34 In current work, it has become standard to dene search intensity by the number of simultaneous job applications
workers send out, see Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2003, 2006), Gautier and Moraga-González (2004), Gautier
and Woltho¤ (2006), Galenianos and Kircher (2005), Kircher (2007), Shimer (2004), Chade and Smith (2006).
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(2004), which is what we do here.
Finally, there are a couple of other papers that study the general equilibrium e¤ects of labor
market policies that increase search intensity. Flinn (2006) estimates a matching model with Nash
bargaining and nds potential positive welfare e¤ects of a binding minimum wage. This is consistent
with our ndings. Davidson and Woodbury (1993) and Blundell, Costa Dias and Meghir (2003)
study the general equilibrium e¤ects of giving a subset of workers a wage bonus or subsidy. Both
nd huge o¤setting equilibrium e¤ects and the latter even nd a sign reversal since jobs taken by
the treatment group would in the absence of the treatment be lled by non-treated workers. Lise,
Seitz and Smith (2003) calibrate their equilibrium search model to data from the control group and
then simulate a Canadian income assistance program within the model. They show that the model
mimics the transition rate of the treatment group but that the total welfare e¤ects are reversed
when the general equilibrium e¤ects are taken into account. A similar methodology is applied in
Todd and Wolpin (2003). We estimate the equilibrium model from the beginning and then compare
the optimal search intensity distribution with the observed one and nd that non-participation is
too high and unemployed workers search to intensively. In our model, wage subsidy or counseling
schemes for a subset of currently unemployed workers will increases their search intensity and
individual employment probabilities but at the same time reduce the employment probabilities for
other workers. Our results suggest that active labor market programs can best be targeted at the
weakly attached workers, i.e. the ones who are non-participant but who are close to the margin of
participating.
8 Final remarks
We have presented a structural estimation of the search cost distribution and the implied search
intensity of workers. Unlike most of the literature, we have explicitly dened the search intensity as
the number of applications that workers send out per period. The model is estimated by maximum
likelihood using wages of newly hired workers. We nd that in all segments most unemployed
workers search once or twice per four months while a small fraction of the searchers (between 0:7
and 2:5%) applies to thirty jobs. We also show that the decentralized market outcome is about
15% to 20% below the constrained planners outcome who takes the coordination frictions, value
of home production, productivity and the search cost distribution as given. It appears that the
planner would like some workers to search less. Especially, applying for two or thirty jobs is socially
wasteful. Clearly, this conclusion could change if rms are heterogeneous. Then sending a large
number of applications can improve the quality of the match. Another important policy lesson
of our model is that job creation programs or programs to increase labor force participation have
small positive or negative e¤ects in isolation but policies that aim to simultaneously create more
jobs and increase participation can be much more e¤ective.
One important real world feature that we left out in the model is on-the-job search. A natural
question is therefore how our results would change if we did allow for it. The answer to this
question depends on how employed and unemployed workers compete. Since unemployed workers
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have an unattractive outside option rms would prefer to o¤er a wage conditional on previous labor
market state if they could. In that case, allowing for on the job search would (i) decrease expected
job duration and (ii) would increase our estimate for home production. (i) has a similar e¤ect as
increasing the match destruction rate , which does not a¤ect the estimates for the search fractions
pa, the job o¤er probability  , the productivity y, etc. It only changes the scale of the search cost
distribution. (ii) is caused by the fact that the option value of search during unemployment relative
to search during employment goes down. In order for the reservation wage to be equal to the lowest
wage in the segment, h would have to go up. Decreasing the denition of a period has an impact
on the discount factor and only rescales the search cost distribution. Hence, if we consider a period
to be two rather than 4 months, the same results would apply if the yearly discount rate would be
about 10% rather than the 5% we assume now.
Another important assumption in our model was that rms that fail to hire their candidate
cannot o¤er the job to the next candidate. Albrecht et al. (2006) show that allowing for rms to
make shortlists of workers is very tedious. It does reduce coordination frictions and consequently
increases the matching rates but recall does not eliminate the coordination frictions because a rm
with four candidates can still loose all of them to competing rms. Allowing for recall will increase
the social benets of sending multiple applications.
Compared to the other empirical equilibrium search models in the literature we have modelled
the matching process and search intensity with a lot more detail but in other respects our model
is simpler. For example, since workers are ex ante identical, unemployment duration follows a
geometrical distribution while in reality there typically is negative duration dependence. One way
to get positive duration dependence in our framework is by assuming the heterogeneity in search
cost to be worker specic such that high-search-cost workers receive fewer o¤ers in each period in
expectation. This is a research avenue we plan to pursue in future work.
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Appendix
A Derivations
A.1 Equal prot condition
The payo¤ of a rm is y   k   w in case of a match. A rm matches if it o¤ers its candidate
a higher wage than all other rms competing for the same worker. The probability for a rm to
have at least one applicant is equal to 1  e . The conditional probability that the candidate has
sent a applications is given by apaPS
i=1 ipi
. The a   1 other applications of the candidate result in
j 2 f0; 1; :::; a  1g other job o¤ers with probability  (jja  1), which are all lower with probability
F jw (w). Hence, the expected payo¤ of a rm o¤ering w is given by
 (w) = (y   k   w)

1  e 
 SX
a=1
apaPS
i=1 ipi
a 1X
j=0
 (jja  1)F jw (w) :
By using
 
1  e  =  = PSi=1 ipi  and the denition of  (jja  1), we can simplify this expres-
sion as follows
 (w) = (y   k   w) 
SX
a=1
apaPS
i=1 ipi
a 1X
j=0

a  1
j

 j (1   )a 1 j F jw (w)
= (y   k   w) 1

SX
a=1
apa
a 1X
j=0

a  1
j

 j+1 (1   )a 1 j F jw (w)
= (y   k   w) 1

SX
a=1
aX
j=1
apa

a  1
j   1

 j (1   )a j F j 1w (w)
= (y   k   w) 1

SX
j=1
jqjF
j 1
w (w) :
A.2 Likelihood
The rst step in the estimation of the model is to calculate the fraction of non-searchers p0. From
equation (3), it follows that it equals the ratio of the fraction of non-participants in the population
to the fraction of non-employed:
p0 =
n
1  e: (29)
The other fractions pa are estimated by maximizing the likelihood that the observed wages are
generated by our model. Note that a distribution for pa, together with v, u and the urn-ball type
of matching function that follows from (4) and (5), implies a job o¤er probability  . This job o¤er
probability is the key parameter in the mapping from the number of applications pa to the number
of job o¤ers qj . Given estimates for the net productivity by and the lower bound w of the support
of the wage o¤er distribution Fw (w), we can calculate the upper bound w of the support by using
equation (21). Then, we can solve equation (20) to get the full wage o¤er distribution.
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Note that in data one typically does not observe all wage o¤ers, but only the wage o¤ers that
have been accepted by the workers. Since workers can compare wage o¤ers, high wage o¤ers are
more likely to be accepted than low wage o¤ers. This implies that the distributions of the o¤ered
wages and of the accepted wages di¤er from each other. Let Gw (w) denote the distribution of the
wages accepted by the non-employed workers. In order to derive an expression for Gw (w), consider
a worker who receives j > 0 job o¤ers. She will only accept a wage that is lower than some value
w if all her j job o¤ers are lower than this value. As a result, the following relationship between
Gw (w) and Fw (w) holds:
Gw (w) =
PS
j=1 qjF
j
w (w)
1  q0 : (30)
It is straightforward to show that Gw (w) rst-order stochastically dominates Fw (w). Taking the
rst derivative of this expression with respect to w gives the density of the accepted wages:
gw (w) =
PS
j=1 jqjF
j 1
w (w) fw (w)
1  q0 ; (31)
where fw (w) denotes the density function of the posted wages. An expression for this density can
be derived by applying the implicit function theorem to equation (20). This yields
fw (w) =
PS
j=1 jqjF
j 1
w (w)
(y   k   w)PSj=2 j (j   1) qjF j 2w (w) :
These equations show that gw (w) only depends on the productivity and the capital cost via the
di¤erence y   k. Hence, in the maximum likelihood estimation only the net productivity by is
identied. Ex post however, we can obtain estimates for y and k by using the equality y = by + k
and by rewriting the free entry condition (26) in the following way:
k =
1
r + 
1

q1 (by   w) .
As we explain in the main text, we estimate the lower bound w of the support of the wage
distribution as a parameter in the maximum likelihood procedure. Together with the estimate forby, this implies a value for the upper bound w. In order to explain observations outside the bounds
of the support, we allow for measurement error. To be precise, we assume that the observed wageew depends on the true wage w and a random error term " in a multiplicative way:
ew = w":
The error term " has a log-normal distribution with parameters  = 0 and 2 = var(log (")) : We
estimate  as a parameter in the maximum likelihood procedure. The density of the observed
wages can then be obtained by integrating over all possible values of the error term. If a wage ew
is observed, the error term must have been in the interval [ ew=w; ew=w]. Hence, the density of the
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observed wages g ew ( ew) is equal to
g ew ( ew) = Z ew=wew=w gw ( ew=") 1" (") d"; (32)
where 1=" is the Jacobian of the transformation,  (") denotes the log-normal density and gw (w)
is given by (31). The integral in this equation must be calculated numerically, since it depends on
Fw (w), for which no explicit expression exists. Assuming independence of the N observations, the
maximum likelihood problem is then given by
max
p1;:::;pS ;;w;by
1
N
NX
i=1
log g ew ( ewi) ;
subject to the conditions
PS
a=0 pa = 1, pa 2 [0; 1] 8a and wmin  w  by.
A.3 Search cost distribution
The maximum likelihood estimation provides us with estimates for p0; :::; pS ; w and y. Using these
estimates, we can derive cuto¤ points of the search cost distribution according to equation (17).
This requires the calculation of the marginal gains from search  a as given by equation (16).
Note that this variable depends on the integral
R1
wR
wdFw (w)
j . To simplify the calculation of this
integral, we apply a change of variables.
First, invert equation (20) and denote the inverse function of Fw (w) by w (z)
w (z) = y   k   (y   k   w) q1PS
j=1 jqjz
j 1 : (33)
Then, we can write: Z 1
wR
wdF jw (w) =
Z w
w
wdF jw (w) =
Z 1
0
jw (z) zj 1dz;
Substituting this in equation (15) gives
a =
aX
j=1
 (jja)
Z 1
0
j
 by   wR   (by   w) q1PS
i=1 iqiz
i 1
!
zj 1dz
The marginal gains from an additional application can then be calculated from (16). The equilib-
rium value for the separation rate  that we need in this calculation follows from the steady state
condition given in equation (1):
 =
(1  q0) (1  e)
e
:
This procedure gives us S cuto¤ points ( 1; :::; S) of the search cost distribution Fc (c). For
some purposes, e.g. for assessing the e¢ ciency of the market equilibrium, we need an estimate
of the full distribution (i.e. for every possible value of c). On the interval [0; 1] we obtain this
estimate by using linear interpolation between the cuto¤ points:
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Fc (c) =
PS
j=i+1 pj +
pi
 i  i+1 (c   i+1) 8c 2 [ i+1; i) and i = f1; :::; Sg ;
where we dene  S+1 = 0.
For c >  1 we assume that the search cost distribution keeps increasing linearly, with the same
slope as just before  1, until it reaches 1. Hence, on this interval Fc (c) is given by
Fc (c) =

1  p0 + p1 1  2 (c   1) 8c 2 [ 1; 0)
1 8c   0 , where  0 =  1 +
p0
p1
( 1    2) :
For solving the planners problem we also need estimates for the unemployment benets b and
the household production h. The value for b equals the product of the replacement rate  and the
average wage:
b = 
Z w
w
wdGw (w) = 
 
wR +
1
1  q0
SX
a=1
paa
!
:
Use this and (14) to derive an estimate for h. Using the same simplications as above, we can
rewrite this expression as
h = wR  
Z 1
0
max
a

Ia>0b+
1
r + 
a   ca

dFc (c) (34)
Next, partition the support of Fc (c) into the intervals [ S+1; S), [ S ; S 1), :::, [ 2; 1), [ 1; 0],
where  S+1 and  0 are the lower bound and the upper bound of the support of Fc (c). Due to the
linear interpolation, f (c) is constant on each of these intervals. Let fa denote the value of f (c) on
the interval [ a+1; a). Then the following expression holds:
fa =
F ( a)  F ( a+1)
 a    a+1 =
pa
 a    a+1 :
Substituting this in (34), we can write
h = wR  
SX
a=1
Z  a
 a+1

Ia>0b+
1
r + 
a   ca

pa
 a    a+1dc
= wR   1
r + 
SX
a=1
paa +
1
2
SX
a=1
apa ( a +  a+1)  b (1  p0)
= wR   1
r + 
SX
a=1
pa

a +
1
2
a (a+1   a 1)

  b

1  p0   1
2
p1

;
where we dene S+1 = S to simplify notation. This relates h to variables that we can estimate
or directly observe.
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B Labor market segments
In order to create the segments, we construct a worker skill index Ls and a job-complexity index Lc,
as in Gautier and Teulings (2006). For the worker skills we assume the following linear relationship
! = Xss + "s;
where s is a vector of coe¢ cients and "s is an error term. The matrix Xs contains the explanatory
variables: gender, years of education, years of working experience35 (also squared and cubed),
interaction terms, and year dummies. Next, we dene the skill Ls of an individual as the predicted
value following from this regression:
Ls = Xs^s;
where ^s = (X 0sXs)
 1X 0s!. Likewise, we construct a complexity measure for the jobs. We regress
the logarithm of the wage paid by rm for this job on several job and rm characteristics:
! = Xcc + "c;
where Xc includes a constant, dummy variables for the sector, the type of contract for this job, the
job level, occupation, and year dummies.36 The complexity Lc of the job is dened as the predicted
value of the regression:
Lc = Xc^c
= Xc
 
X 0cXc
 1
X 0c!:
C Flow probabilities
As discussed in section 4, we assume that a year consists of three periods. This implies that a
worker can ow from employment in year  (time t) to non-employment in year  + 1 (time t+ 3)
in four di¤erent ways. She can loose her job at the beginning of either period t+ 1, t+ 2 or t+ 3,
and remain non-employed after that. Alternatively, she can loose her job at t+1, get a new job at
t+ 2 and loose it again at t+ 3. Hence, the yearly separation rate W;3 for the workers is given by
W;3 =  (1 mW )2 + (1  )  (1 mW ) + (1  )2  + mW 
= 
 
2 +m2W + 2mW   3   3mW + 3

:
Expressions for the yearly separation rate of rms (F;3) and the annual matching probability
for workers (mW;3) and rms (mF;3) can be derived in a similar way. The per-period matching
35As common in literature, we dene work experience as a function of age and the years of schooling. To be precise,
we assume the following relation: experience = (age - years of education - 6) / 50, where rescaling is applied for
reasons of computational convenience.
36Although we also observe the size of the rm, we do not include this variable in the job complexity regression to
avoid endogeneity problems.
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probability conditional on search is given by
mW jU = 1 
q0   p0
1  p0 =
1  q0
1  p0 :
The annual matching probability conditional on search in the current period therefore equals
mW jU;3 = mW jU (1  )2 +
 
1 mW jU

mW (1  ) +
 
1 mW jU

(1 mW )mW +mW jUmW :
In order to be able to compare the estimated probabilities to the actual ones, we aggregate over
the segments. For this we need to know the relative size si (i.e. the total mass of workers) for each
of the segments. Normalize the size of the rst segment to 1. Note that we dened the segments
in such a way that the expected number of people owing from non-employment to employment is
the same in each one of them. Hence, the relative size si of segment i > 1 is dened by
mW;3;i (1  ei) si = mW;3;1 (1  e1) ;
where mW;3;i denotes the annual matching probability and ei the employment rate in segment i.
The total number of matches formed in the market is then equal to
P5
i=1mW;3;i (1  ei) si and the
total number of non-employed workers equals
P5
i=1 (1  ei) si. So, the aggregate annual matching
probability mW;3 can be calculated as follows:
mW;3 =
P5
i=1mW;3;i (1  ei) siP5
i=1 (1  ei) si
:
Aggregating mW jU;3 can be done in a similar way. Likewise, the following expression holds for the
aggregate annual separation probability W;3:
W;3 =
P5
i=1 W;3;ieisiP5
i=1 eisi
;
where W;3;i is the yearly separation rate in segment i.
The aggregate annual matching rate for the rms can be calculated according to
mF;3 =
P5
i=1mF;3;iviNF;isiP5
i=1 viNF;isi
;
where vi and NF;i respectively denote the fraction of vacancies and the measure of rms in segment
i.
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D Tables and gures
Variable Estimate Std.err. Variable Estimate Std.err.
Constant 1.192 0.116 * Year
1997 -0.012 0.015
Education 1998 0.010 0.014
Years of education 0.075 0.008 * 2000 0.054 0.014 *
2001 0.036 0.015 *
Gender 2002 0.041 0.016 *
Male -0.047 0.032
Interaction e¤ects
Experience Educ.  Experience -0.110 0.066
Experience 3.792 0.930 * Educ.  Experience2 0.404 0.183 *
Experience2 -9.955 2.283 * Educ.  Experience3 -0.378 0.156 *
Experience3 7.805 1.733 * Male  Experience 0.349 0.355
Male  Experience2 0.790 1.016
Statistics Male  Experience3 -1.343 0.817
Observations 5801
R2 0.358
* = signicant at 5% level.
Reference groups: female, 1996.
Table 1: Estimation results of the skill regression
Variable Estimate Std.err. Variable Estimate Std.err.
Constant 2.251 0.023 * Job level
Level 2 0.027 0.014 *
Sector Level 3 0.166 0.014 *
Industry -0.026 0.019 Level 4 0.327 0.016 *
Education -0.013 0.028 Level 5 0.570 0.023 *
Construction 0.133 0.022 * Level 6-8 0.743 0.046 *
Trade, reparation -0.052 0.021 *
Hotel, catering 0.055 0.031 Occupation type
Transport, communic. -0.049 0.023 * Administrative -0.031 0.012 *
Financial services -0.001 0.031 Automation -0.022 0.021
Other services -0.064 0.022 * Commercial -0.029 0.015 *
Health care 0.007 0.026 Service providing -0.062 0.011 *
Culture, recreation -0.052 0.036 * Creative -0.021 0.031
Management 0.193 0.039 *
Year
1997 -0.025 0.013 Coll. empl. agreement (CAO)
1998 0.001 0.013 AVV 0.081 0.015 *
2000 0.023 0.013 Company CAO -0.047 0.019 *
2001 0.014 0.013 No CAO -0.052 0.010 *
2002 0.051 0.015 *
Statistics
Observations 5801
R2 0.475
* = signicant at 5% level.
Reference groups: agriculture, 1996, industry CAO, 1-4 employees, level 1, simple technical activities.
Table 2: Estimation results of the complexity regression
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Segment
1 2 3 4 5
Labor market states
Employment (e) 0.479 0.615 0.736 0.790 0.875
Unemployment (u) 0.043 0.033 0.030 0.027 0.022
Non-participation (n) 0.477 0.351 0.234 0.183 0.103
Vacancies
Number of vacancies (vNF ) 0.030 0.023 0.021 0.019 0.015
Non-participation
Number of non-participants (p0) 0.917 0.914 0.885 0.870 0.826
Wage distribution
Lowest observed wage 7.40 7.42 7.36 8.08 9.46
Highest observed wage 12.07 14.08 15.17 16.81 27.25
Mean observed wage 9.00 10.07 10.73 12.17 15.75
Table 3: Values of the exogenous parameters per segment
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Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3 Segment 4 Segment 5
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
Observations 1043 1179 1153 1070 1022
Male 0.52 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.71 0.45 0.72 0.45 0.67 0.47
Education 8.05 1.88 10.42 1.88 11.72 2.16 12.93 2.23 14.75 1.38
Age 32.55 9.45 31.83 9.70 31.49 8.78 31.93 8.73 33.50 8.65
Sector
Agriculture 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14
Industry 0.30 0.46 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.44 0.18 0.39 0.15 0.36
Education 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.11
Construction 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.16 0.07 0.26 0.21 0.40 0.09 0.29
Trade, reparation 0.17 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.33 0.08 0.27
Hotel, catering 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.10
Transp., communic. 0.04 0.20 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.17
Financial services 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.17 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24
Other services 0.27 0.45 0.19 0.39 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.37 0.48
Health care 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.34 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.13 0.34
Culture, recreation 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.14 0.04 0.19
Coll. empl. agr.
Industry CAO 0.55 0.50 0.63 0.48 0.62 0.49 0.62 0.49 0.53 0.50
AVV 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.25 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29
Company CAO 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.14
No CAO 0.32 0.47 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.36 0.48
Firm size
1-4 employees 0.02 0.16 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.15
5-9 employees 0.08 0.27 0.06 0.24 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29 0.09 0.29
10-19 employees 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.34 0.09 0.28
20-49 employees 0.22 0.42 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.37 0.21 0.41 0.12 0.33
50-99 employees 0.09 0.29 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.29 0.12 0.33
100-199 employees 0.10 0.31 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.33 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.28
200-499 employees 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.36 0.11 0.31 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.34
 500 employees 0.22 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.33 0.47
Job level
Level 1 0.21 0.41 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Level 2 0.57 0.49 0.20 0.40 0.07 0.25 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.02
Level 3 0.21 0.41 0.76 0.43 0.75 0.43 0.45 0.50 0.09 0.29
Level 4 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.17 0.38 0.51 0.50 0.33 0.47
Level 5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.44 0.50
Level 6-8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.35
Nature of occupation
Simple techn. act. 0.39 0.49 0.33 0.47 0.42 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.23 0.42
Administrative 0.08 0.28 0.20 0.40 0.15 0.36 0.19 0.40 0.13 0.34
Automation 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.16 0.05 0.22 0.08 0.27
Commercial 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.31 0.12 0.33 0.10 0.31
Service providing 0.46 0.50 0.38 0.48 0.29 0.45 0.19 0.40 0.25 0.43
Creative 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.18 0.13 0.33
Management 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.29
Table 4: Descriptive statistics per segment
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Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3 Segment 4 Segment 5
est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e. est. s.e.
Applications (in %)
p1 57.9 8.4 63.7 5.4 39.3 18.2 37.9 1.18 39.1 10.9
p2 40.1 8.1 35.4 5.3 59.7 17.9 61.4 11.7 58.4 10.5
::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: :::
p30 2.0 0.4 0.9 0.2 1.0 0.3 0.7 0.2 2.5 0.5
Other ML parametersby 17.68 0.89 26.96 1.50 26.15 2.04 30.70 1.72 39.54 2.72
w 7.51 0.00 7.51 0.00 7.56 0.12 8.29 0.13 10.61 0.29
 0.012 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.031 0.012 0.026 0.013 0.074 0.016
Job o¤ers (in %)
q0 56.5 1.2 52.0 0.6 51.2 0.6 49.9 0.4 57.1 1.2
q1 37.1 1.7 41.7 1.0 40.6 1.2 41.6 0.7 35.5 1.4
q2 4.4 0.3 5.4 0.4 7.2 0.6 7.7 0.5 4.9 0.4
::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: :::
q4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
q5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
q6 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1
q7 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1
q8 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1
q9 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1
q10 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0
q11 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0
q12 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0
q13 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
q14 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
q15 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Transition probabilities (in %)
 3.9 2.6 2.0 1.7 1.1
mW 3.6 4.1 5.6 6.5 7.5
mF 62.2 68.6 69.7 71.5 61.3
Other variables
 2.824 2.308 2.692 2.607 3.313
 (in %) 33.3 39.0 34.6 35.5 29.1
b 3.60 4.02 4.27 4.83 6.26
h [0,7.08] [0,6.74] 6.11 6.15 6.52
k 96.66 274.06 295.20 395.23 541.31
EFw [w] 8.87 9.91 10.46 11.86 15.11
EGw [w] 9.01 10.06 10.67 12.09 15.65
Statistics
Obs. 1043 1179 1153 1070 1022
LogL. -1.352 -1.776 -1.940 -2.077 -2.641
KS 3.25 1.26 1.59 1.53 1.29
The presented fractions (in %) are conditional on searching at least once. The fraction of non-searchers (p0) is
displayed in table 3. The not reported fractions are equal to (or rounded down to) zero for all segments.
Table 5: Estimation results
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Segment
1 2 3 4 5
Data
wavg 9.12 10.21 10.97 12.35 16.33
w1% 7.12 7.50 7.40 7.14 8.31
w2% 7.50 7.65 7.51 7.98 9.06
w5% 7.51 7.90 7.92 8.60 10.22
Mp1 1.281 1.361 1.481 1.729 1.965
Mp2 1.216 1.336 1.461 1.548 1.803
Mp5 1.215 1.293 1.385 1.435 1.598
Model
mW 0.036 0.041 0.056 0.065 0.075
mW jU 0.435 0.480 0.488 0.501 0.429
 0.039 0.026 0.020 0.017 0.011
r 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016
 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.400
MmNE 1.572 1.435 1.310 1.258 1.190
MmU 1.073 1.051 1.044 1.039 1.037
Table 6: Mean-min ratio in data and model
Market Planner Market Planner
cstr. uncstr. cstr. uncstr.
Segment 1 Segment 2
p0 91.7 76.3 70.5 p0 91.4 71.0 65.8
p1 4.8 23.7 29.5 p1 5.5 29.0 34.2
p2 3.3 0.0 0.0 p2 3.1 0.0 0.0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
p30 0.2 0.0 0.0 p30 0.1 0.0 0.0
NF 0.510 0.782 0.917 NF 0.639 0.858 0.954
Output 8.28 9.96 12.08 Output 11.77 14.52 17.77
Gain 20% 46% Gain 23% 51%
Segment 3 Segment 4
p0 88.5 70.6 66.8 p0 87.0 69.0 65.6
p1 4.5 29.4 33.2 p1 4.9 31.0 34.4
p2 6.9 0.0 0.0 p2 8.0 0.0 0.0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
p30 0.1 0.0 0.0 p30 0.1 0.0 0.0
NF 0.757 0.886 0.962 NF 0.809 0.904 0.969
Output 13.56 15.83 18.54 Output 16.78 19.07 22.10
Gain 17% 37% Gain 14% 32%
Segment 5
p0 82.6 52.5 50.0
p1 6.8 47.5 50.0
p2 10.1 0.0 0.0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
p30 0.4 0.0 0.0
NF 0.890 0.962 0.989
Output 25.81 29.93 32.45
Gain 16% 26%
The fractions pa are percentages. Omitted values are equal to (or rounded down to) zero.
Table 7: Comparison of the market equilibrium with the constrained (cstr) and unconstrained
(uncstr) planners solution
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Market Planner Market Planner
Segment 1 (h = 0) Segment 1 (h = 6:99)
p0 91.7 80.7 p0 91.7 74.4
p1 4.8 19.3 p1 4.8 25.6
p2 3.3 0.0 p2 3.3 0.0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
p30 0.2 0.0 p30 0.2 0.0
NF 0.510 0.781 NF 0.510 0.787
Output 5.10 6.47 Output 8.74 10.55
Gain 27% Gain 20%
Segment 2 (h = 0) Segment 2 (h = 6:63)
p0 91.4 079.2 p0 91.4 69.3
p1 5.5 20.8 p1 5.5 30.7
p2 3.1 0.0 p2 3.1 0.0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
p30 0.1 0.0 p30 0.1 0.0
NF 0.639 0.833 NF 0.639 0.863
Output 9.42 11.05 Output 11.97 14.89
Gain 17% Gain 24%
The fractions pa are percentages. Omitted values are equal to (or rounded down to) zero.
Table 8: E¤ect of bounds for household production on the planners solution
Market Planner Market Planner
max. cost lin. cost min. cost max. cost lin. cost min. cost
Segment 1 Segment 2
p0 91.7 91.7 76.3 0.0 p0 91.4 91.4 71.0 0.0
p1 4.8 8.3 23.7 100.0 p1 5.5 8.6 29.0 100.0
p2 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 p2 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
p30 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 p30 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
NF 0.510 0.547 0.782 0.957 NF 0.639 0.636 0.858 0.964
Output 8.28 9.18 9.96 11.37 Output 11.77 12.91 14.52 16.46
Gain 11% 20% 37% Gain 10% 23% 40%
Segment 3 Segment 4
p0 88.5 88.5 70.6 0.0 p0 87.0 87.0 69.0 0.0
p1 4.5 11.5 29.4 100.0 p1 4.9 13.0 31.0 100.0
p2 6.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 p2 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
p30 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 p30 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
NF 0.757 0.747 0.886 0.972 NF 0.809 0.793 0.904 0.975
Output 13.56 14.79 15.83 17.37 Output 16.78 18.02 19.07 20.67
Gain 9% 17% 28% Gain 7% 14% 23%
Segment 5
p0 82.6 82.6 52.5 0.0
p1 6.8 17.4 47.5 100.0
p2 10.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
p30 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
NF 0.890 0.896 0.962 0.985
Output 25.81 28.76 29.93 31.04
Gain 11% 16% 20%
The fractions pa are percentages. Omitted values are equal to (or rounded down to) zero.
Table 9: E¤ect of bounds on non-participants search cost on the planners solution
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Market Planner Market Planner
max. cost lin. cost min. cost max. cost lin. cost min. cost
Segment 1 Segment 2
h 6.11 7.51 6.11 6.23 h 6.11 7.51 6.11 4.66
p0 91.7 91.7 76.3 0.0 p0 91.4 91.4 71.0 0.0
p1 4.8 4.8 23.7 100.0 p1 5.5 5.5 29.0 100.0
p2 3.3 3.3 0.0 0.0 p2 3.1 3.1 0.0 0.0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
p30 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 p30 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
NF 0.510 0.559 0.782 0.957 NF 0.639 0.640 0.858 0.964
Output 8.28 9.42 9.96 11.45 Output 11.77 12.82 14.52 16.48
Gain 14% 20% 38% Gain 9% 23% 40%
Segment 3 Segment 4
h 6.11 7.56 6.11 2.30 h 6.15 8.29 6.15 0.34
p0 88.5 88.6 70.6 0.0 p0 87.0 87.1 69.0 0.0
p1 4.5 4.5 29.4 100.0 p1 4.9 4.9 31.0 100.0
p2 6.9 6.9 0.0 0.0 p2 8.0 8.0 0.0 0.0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
p30 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 p30 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
NF 0.757 0.767 0.886 0.972 NF 0.809 0.812 0.904 0.975
Output 13.56 14.44 15.83 17.31 Output 16.78 17.57 19.07 20.58
Gain 7% 17% 28% Gain 5% 14% 23%
Segment 5
h 10.61 7.51 6.52 -4.35
p0 82.6 83.1 52.5 0.0
p1 6.8 6.8 47.5 100.0
p2 10.1 10.1 0.0 0.0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
p30 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
NF 0.890 0.901 0.962 0.985
Output 25.81 28.39 29.93 30.94
Gain 10% 16% 20%
The fractions pa are percentages. Omitted values are equal to (or rounded down to) zero.
Table 10: Bounds on the planners solution for a general class of search cost functions
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Figure 1: gw(w) for di¤erent values of the fractions fp0; p1; :::; pSg
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Figure 2: Relation between the wage distribution and the search cost distribution. For the ease of
graphical exposition, the gure shows a special case in which b = 0, wR = 0, r +  = 1 and S = 5. The gure is
purely illustrative and no inferences about the actual distributions of wages and search costs should be made from it.
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Figure 3: Estimated wage densities
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Figure 4: Estimated search cost distributions
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Figure 5: Estimated search cost distributions for segment 1 and 2 using bounds on the value of
household production
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Figure 6: Non-participation and unemployment in the market equilibrium and the planners solu-
tions
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